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URSI Resolution (1999) 
The URSI “Resolution of Criminal Activities using Electromagnetic Tools” 
was intended to make people aware of: 
1) the existence of criminal activities using electromagnetic tools and 
associated phenomena; 
2) the fact that criminal activities using electromagnetic tools can be 
undertaken covertly and anonymously and that physical boundaries 
such as fences and walls can be penetrated by electromagnetic 
fields; 
3) the potential serious nature of the effects of criminal activities using 
electromagnetic tools on the infrastructure and important functions in 
society such as transportation, communication, security, and 
medicine ..);  
4) that in consequence, the possible disruption on the life, health and 
economic activities of nations could have a major consequence 
1.1 Motivation 
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URSI Resolution (1999) 
The URSI “Resolution of Criminal Activities using  Electromagnetic Tools” 
recommended: 
1) Perform additional research pertaining to criminal activities using 
electromagnetic tools in order to establish appropriate levels of 
vulnerability. 
2) Investigate techniques for appropriate protection against criminal 
activities using electromagnetic tools and to provide methods that can 
be used to protect the public from the damage that can be done to 
the infrastructure by terrorists. 
3) Develop high-quality testing and assessment methods to evaluate 
system performance in these special electromagnetic environments. 
4) Provide reasonable data regarding the formulation of standards of 
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Development since 1999 
1) Worldwide rise of terrorist (asymmetric) threats; 
2) Technological development enabled the design of high-power 
IEMI sources and components (e.g. antennas)  
 Availability of IEMI sources 
 Proliferation of IEMI technologies 
 Increase of potential threat 
3) Increasing dependency of all parts of modern society on  
IT-technology 
4) Worldwide investigation of the susceptibility of electronic 
systems against IEMI environments 
 Decreasing susceptibility levels 
 Classical EMC protection measures are ineffective against 
IEMI  disturbances 
 Increasing vulnerability 
1.1 Motivation 
Page 12 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Key Question 
1.) How large is the possibility that an IEMI attack 
occurs? 
 possibility that an electronic system faces 
an IEMI environment 
2.) How dangerous is the IEMI threat?  
 ability of the IEMI threat (environment) to 
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Documented Criminal  Usage of EM  
1. In Japan, criminals used an EM disruptor on a gaming 
machine to trigger a false win 
2. In St. Petersburg, a criminal used an EM disruptor to disable a 
security system an a Jeweler store 
3. In Kizlyar, Dagestan, Russia Chechen rebel command 
disabled police radio communication using RF jammer during 
a raid. 
4. In multiple European cities (e.g. Berlin) criminals used  
GSM-Jammern to disable the security system of  limousines. 
5. In Russia, Chechen rebels used an EM disruptor to defeat a 
security system and gain access to a controlled area. 
1.1 Motivation 
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Documented Criminal  Usage of EM  
6. In London, UK, a city bank was the target of blackmail attempt 
whereby the use of EM disruptors was threatened to be used 
against the banks IT-system. 
7. In the Netherlands an individual disrupted a local bank IT 
network because he was refused loan. He constructed a 
briefcase-size EM disruptor, which he learned how to build 
from the internet. 
8. In Moscow, the normal work of one automatic telephone 
station has been stopped as a result of remote injection of a 
voltage in to a telephone line. As a result 200 thousand people 
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Example: Car Theft 
In several European cities  
(e.g., Berlin) car thieves used 
GSM jammer to suppress  
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Example: Safety System 
In several Russian towns (e.g., St. 
Petersburg) criminals suppressed the 
security system of shops (jewellers) with 
the help of repeating EMI transmitters. 
 
In Kizlyar, Dagestan, Russia Chechen 
rebel command disabled police radio 
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Example: Smart House 
Source: http://www.isocket.de/examples/ 
1.1 Motivation 
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Example: Disturbance of IT-System 
In the Netherlands an individual disrupted a 
local bank IT network because he was 
refused loan. He constructed a briefcase-
size EM disruptor, which he learned how to 
build from the internet. 
More than one month the engineers of the 
bank had no notion that the component 
destructions and malfunctions were caused 
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Example: Automatic Telephone Exchange  
In Moscow, the normal work of one automatic telephone station 
has been stopped as a result of remote injection of a voltage in 
to a telephone line.  
As a result 200 thousand  
people had no phone  
connection for one day 
Source: http://de.wikipedia.org/ 
1.1 Motivation 
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Aim 
1.2 Content of  Lecture 
The participants shall be capable to  
• know the different classes of EMI sources,  
• name effects caused in complex distriubuted 
systems,  
• explain methods that are capable to analyze the 
risk of EMI  disturbance of electronic systems, and 
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Content 
1. Introduction & Basic Terms 
2. Fundamentals of Risk Management 
3. Risk Analysis Methods 
4. EMI Scenario 
5. Modeling of scenarios and systems 
6. Effects and Error States 
7. Risk Evaluation 
8. Risk Treatment and Protection 
9. Examples 
10.Summary 
1.2 Content of  Lecture 
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Definition: Infrastructure 
1.3.1  Critical Infrastructure 
The infrastructure of a country, society, or 
organization consists of the basic facilities such 
as transport, communications, power supplies, 
and buildings, which enable it to function.  
Source: COBUILD Advanced English Dictionary. Copyright © HarperCollins Publishers 
22.01.2021 
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Definition: Critical Infrastructure 
1.3.1  Critical Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructure means an asset, system or 
part thereof located in nations which is essential for 
the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, 
safety, security, economic or social well-being of 
people, and the disruption or destruction of which 
would have a significant impact in a nation as a 
result of the failure to maintain those functions; 
Source: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 
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Critical Infrastructures 
1.3.1  Critical Infrastructure 
Basic technical 
infrastructures 
• Energy supply 
• Information and 
communication technology 
• Transport and transport 




• Health service, 
• Food, 
• Emergency and rescue 
services, civil protection, 
• parliament, government, public 
administration, judicial 
institutions, 
• finance and insurance, 
• Media and cultural assets 
22.01.2021 
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Dependence critical infrastructure 





Oil / Gas 
Transportation 
Government Service 
Banking / Financing 
Source: EMP-Report - Critical Infrastructures, 2008 
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Properties Basic Technical Infrastructures 
1.3.1  Critical Infrastructure 
Basic Technical Infrastructures 
•Distributed systems 
•Networked systems 
•High proportion of electronic controllers 
22.01.2021 
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Example: Electric Power Network 
1.3.1  Critical Infrastructure 
• Subsystems distributed 
throughout Germany 
• Different operators 
• Automatic control 
 of electronic controls 
 data exchange is 
necessary 
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Example: Railroad  
1.3.1  Critical Infrastructure 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
22.01.2021 
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Electrical Systems  
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
Electrical systems are systems which are 
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Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
The term electromagnetic interference refers to 
effects caused by the interaction of electrical and 
electronic systems with their electromagnetic 
environment and other systems. 
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Unintentional EM  
Interference  
(EMC) 
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Definition: EMC 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
The electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) characterizes 
the desired state that technical devices do not interfere with 
one another alternately by means of unwanted electrical or 
electromagnetic effects. 
Electromagnetic compatibility addresses technical 
and legal issues of unwanted reciprocal influence in 
electrical engineering. 
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EMC sources of interference 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 






Radar Radio services /  
Broadcasting 
WLAN 
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Spectrum EMI Sources 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
LEMP 
EMC 
0,5 MHz 0,5 GHz 1 GHz 3 GHz 
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Definition: Intentional Electromagnetic Interference 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
“Intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic 
energy introducing noise or signals into electric and 
electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or 
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Definition: Jammer 
A jammer suppresses the correct reception of a radio 
service (such as radio, television, mobile radio or GPS). 
 
The jammer transmits electromagnetic waves, just like the 
transmitter to be interfered with, and completely or partially 
superposes the original waves. The field strength, the 
modulation of the interference transmitter and the nature of 
the interfered message are important. 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
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Definition: High-Power Electromagnetics 
The term high-power electromagnetics generally refers to 
a technological field which deals with the generation of 
strong electromagnetic changes. The generated 
electromagnetic environments of high power can interfere 
with or destroy electrical and electronic systems. 
 
• power density > 26 W/m2 
• electric field strength > 100 V/m, or 
• magnetic field strength > 0.27 A/m 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
22.01.2021 
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High-Power Sources 
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Interference  
(EMC) 
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What is Risk? 
Risk 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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What is Risk? 
Risk 
Possibility of a  
financial loss 
risk of a  
finance action 
possibility of a  
malfunction 
technical risk 




possibility of  
side effects 
Risk of a  
medical therapy 
possibility of  
an injury 
damage 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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Definition Risk 
 Damage/loss is a real 
fact in the past that is 
certain. 
 
 Risk is a virtual fact in 
the future that is 
uncertain. 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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risk = consequence, likelihood   
Definition Risk 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑝 𝑐𝑖  
The risk  
 is the description of a future event with 
the possibility of negative effects. 
 is the impact of uncertainty/uncertainty 
on goals. 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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Risk of Intentional Actions 
negative effect: 
presentation is not shown 
video projector  
does not run 
power OFF no voltage 




Beamer does not  











1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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risk = scenario, consequence, uncertainty  
Risk of Intentional Actions 
intentional (criminal) actions  
 aspects of risk 
 What can happen? (Scenario) 
 What are the effects? 
 How likely can this case occur? (Uncertainty) 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑝(𝑠𝑖 ∩ 𝑐𝑖)  
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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Definition Risk Management 
Risk management includes all formal 
processes and structures for the systematic 
detection, analysis, evaluation, monitoring 
and control of risks. 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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Basic idea of the risk management 
• Risk management is based on the idea that the 
risk can be "managed" by appropriate measures.  
 
• This means "manipulation" 
 the nature of the risk (qualitative), 
 the size of the risk (quantitative), and  
 the temporal window of the occurrence of the 
effect of a risk (time) 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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Principles of the risk management 
Source: ISO 31000:2018, Kap. 4 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
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"classical" EMI Risk Management 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
(1) Ignore risk 
(2) Consideration of the strongest HPEM 
environment and assessment if protective 
measures are necessary 
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EMI Risk Management 
1.3.3  Risk and Risk Management 
An EMI risk management is required to answer the 
questions: 
(1) Identification of EMI caused effects and their 
consequences at the system level 
(2) Assessment of the identified consequences in 
regard with the overall function of the system 
(3) Determination of the likelihood of the effects, 
when applying an EMI environment to the 
system 
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1.3.4  Probability 
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Definition of Probability 
1. Probability axioms 
2. Classical definition of probability 
3. Subjective definition of probability 
1.3.4  Probability 
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Probability Axioms 
1.3.4  Probability 
• First Axiom: 
The probability of an event E is a non-negative real number: 
𝑃 𝐸 ∈  ℝ, 𝑃 𝐸 ≥ 0, ∀𝐸 ∈ 𝐹  
where F is the event space. 
• Second Axiom: 
The probability that at least one of the elementary events in the 
entire sample space  will occur is 1 
𝑃 Ω = 1 
• Third Axiom 
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Classical Definition  
1.3.4  Probability 
If a random experiment has only finitely many results and 
these all have the same probability, then for the 





if n(E) denotes the number of elements of event A and  
n(F) the numbers of elements in the event space F. 
 frequentist interpretation: The relative frequency of 
occurrence of an event, observed in a number of  
repetitions of the experiment, is a measure of the 
probability of that event. 
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Subjective Definition  
1.3.4  Probability 
• The subjective concept of probability understands 
probability as a measure of the safety of the personal 
assessment of a situation. 
• In the case of single or rare random events, their 
probability of occurrence can only be estimated on the 
basis of expert knowledge, experience and intuition. 
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Probability, Scale 
Grundlagen des Risikomanagements  
PS Probability Criterion 
0 - 1 improbable/ unlikely < 1% 
So unlikely, that it can be 
assumed that the event 
does not occurs. 
2 - 3 remote 1% - 5% 
Low possibility that an event 
occurs. 
4 - 6 occasional 5% - 50% 
Event will occur in some, but 
less than half of the cases. 
7 - 8  probable  50% - 90% 
Event will occur in more than 
half of the cases. 
9 - 10 frequent > 90% 
Most likely that an event will 
occur in approximately every 
case. 
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1.3.5  Threat and Hazard 
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Threat 
1.3.5  Threat and Hazard 
A threat is generally a circumstance or event that can 
cause damage..  
 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 
• the application of electromagnetic energy  
to a system by means of which: 
• the functioning of the system can be impaired or 
disturbed 
• which can cause damage.. 
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Hazards 
1.3.5  Threat and Hazard 
• Possibility that a protective material can meet a source of 
damage spatially and/or temporally. 
• The deliberate production of a hazard 
 Attack 
In the context of risk management, potential sources of 
damage (risk matters) are referred to as hazards. 
22.01.2021 
23 
Page 45 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
www.geml.uni-hannover.de 
1.3.6  Reliability and Availability 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
 
Page 46 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Reliability 
1.3.6  Reliability and Availability 
Reliability analysis and risk analysis consider the same system 
property 
• Reliability analysis  
 Probability of trouble-free function 
• Risk analysis  
 Probability of malfunction 
 Risk mitigation 
The reliability of a technical system is a property that 
indicates how reliably a function assigned to the system is 
fulfilled in a time interval. 
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Availability 
1.3.6  Reliability and Availability 
Availability is a performance criterion that can be used to 
assess the magnitude of the effects of an incident. 
The availability of a technical system is the probability or 
measure that the system performs its function at a 
predetermined time or within an agreed time period. 
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1.4  System Oriented Description 
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1.4.1  Phase Modell of the  
Product Life Cycle 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Phase Modell of the Product Life Cycle 
1.4.1  Phase Modell 
Concept Phase 
Concept of the system  
• Definition of the function 
• Development of a system concept 
• Orienting systems analysis 
• Prediction/estimation of ambient conditions 
Information: 
• Concepts (documents) 
• First predictions 
• Draft specifications 
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Phase Modell of the Product Life Cycle 




• Concepts (documents) 
• First predictions 
• Specification of the system 
• Specification of modules and  
   components 
• Specification of interfaces 
System Definition/Design 
• Specification of the system concept 
• Definition of assemblies/devices 
• Specification of modules and  
   components 
• Classification into sub-systems 
• Definition of interfaces 
• Integration analyses 
Page 52 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Phase Modell of the Product Life Cycle 





• Modules / Components 
• Integration measurements 
• Measurement of coupling 
• Measurements on prototypes 
• Qualification measurements 
Design of the system 
• Development, construction and integration of the modules and components 
• System development (realization of system design) 
• System integration 
• Construction of prototypes 
• Proof (qualification) of the specified functions and properties 
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Phase Modell of the Product Life Cycle 






• Documentation / Qualification 
• Quality control 
• Changes in serial production 
• Usually no system measurements  
   are performed in this phase 
Construction of the system 
• Preparation quantity production 
• Quantity production 
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Phase Modell of the Product Life Cycle 





Operation Phase Nutzung des Systems 
• Nutzung des Systems 
• Modernisierung 
• ggf. Erweiterung der Funktionalität 
Information: 
• Experiences from operation/use 
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Phase Modell of the Product Life Cycle 
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1.4.2  Electrical Systems 
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Electrical Systems 
1.4.2  Electronic Systems 
Electrical systems are systems which are operated or 
controlled at least in proportion by electrical energy. 
• Almost all areas of today's life are characterized by the 
increasing use of electrically operated or controlled 
systems. 
• With regard to electromagnetic interference, the 
electrical systems provide possible points of entry for 
electromagnetic couplings and interferences. 
Page 58 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
www.geml.uni-hannover.de 
1.4.3  EMI Coupling Model 
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Interaction Channel Model (Source-victim model) 
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Detailed Coupling Model 










Source: D.V. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems,  
             Artech House, April 2020, Chapter 3, ISBN 978-1630815882, DOI:  
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1. Conducted Coupling 
a) purely conducted (galvanic) coupling, where the 
emission propagates from the emitter to the victim 
through interconnecting cable or conductor.  
b) Conducted coupling via two or multiple cables or 
conductors which are coupled via electric field 
(capacitive coupling) or magnetic field (inductive 
coupled) and connected to either the emitter or the 
victim. 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
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1. Conducted Coupling 
c) Radiation from the emitter to cables, conductors or 
antennas of the victim. Antennas (e.g. WIFI antennas), 
improperly shielded wires or metallic pipes are capable 
of picking up disturbances from surrounding 
electromagnetic fields.  
 
Cases in which the emission is picked up by non-
antenna elements such as apertures, enclosures or 
cables are often labelled as „back door‟ coupling. This 
differentiates it from the coupling to actual antennas or 
electronic sensors, which is known as `front door‟ 
coupling. 
 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
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2. Radiated Coupling 
a) Direct radiation from the emitter to the victim through 
the air. Usually the emitted field propagates from the 
source via antenna structures, penetrates the system 
enclosure and enters the susceptible device via 
apertures. 
b) Radiation form antennas to antennas, e.g. the source 
and receptors are specifically transmitting/receiving 
devices. This path is representative of normal radio 
communication (e. g. Wireless Local Area Networks  
(W-LAN), radio broadcast/reception). 
 
1.3.2  Electromagnetic Interference 
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EMI Risk Management  
2. Fundamentals of Risk Management 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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risk = consequence, likelihood   
Definition Risk 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑝 𝑐𝑖  
The risk  
 is the description of a future event with 
the possibility of negative effects. 
 is the impact of uncertainty/uncertainty 
on goals. 
2. Fundamentals of Risk Management 
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risk = scenario, consequence, uncertainty  
Risk of Intentional Actions 
intentional (criminal) actions  
 aspects of risk 
 What can happen? (Scenario) 
 What are the effects/consequences? 
 How likely can this case occur? (Uncertainty) 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑝(𝑠𝑖 ∩ 𝑐𝑖)  
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2.1 Principles of the risk management 
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Principles of the risk management 

















Source: ISO 31000:2018, Kap. 4 
The shown principles 
provide guidance on 
the characteristics of 
effective and efficient 
risk management, 
communicate its  
value and explain  
its intention and 
purpose.  
These principles 
form the basis for 
dealing with risks 
and should be  
taken into account 
when developing  
the framework and 
risk management 
processes. 
2.1 Principles  
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Principles (2) 
a) integrated 
Risk management is an integral part of all the activities of 
an organization. 
b) structured and comprehensive 
A structured and comprehensive risk management 
approach contributes to consistent and comparable 
results. 
c) tailored 
The framework and the processes of risk management 
are adapted to the external and internal context of an 
organization and are suitably connected with the 
objectives of the organization. 
2.1 Principles  
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Principles (3) 
d) including 
The appropriate and timely participation of stakeholders 
allows for the consideration of their knowledge, views 
and perceptions.  
e) dynamic 
Risks can arise, change, or disappear as the external 
and internal context of an organization changes. These 
changes and events are appropriately and timely 
anticipated, recognized, confirmed and addressed by risk 
management. 
2.1 Principles  
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Principles (4) 
f) best information available 
The input into risk management is based on historical 
and current information as well as future expectations. 
Risk management expressly takes into account all 
restrictions and uncertainties associated with such 
information and expectations. Information should be 
timely, understandable and available to relevant 
stakeholders. 
2.1 Principles  
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Principles (5) 
g) human and cultural factors 
Human behavior and culture have a significant impact on 
all aspects of risk management at all levels and at every 
stage. 
h) continuous improvement 
Risk management is continually improved through 
learning and experience. 
2.1 Principles  
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2.2 Risk Management Framework 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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2.2 Framework 
Risk Management Framework 
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Strategy 
• The risk management strategy should define: 
•Criteria for classifying and evaluating the risks 
•methods of determining risk, 
• responsibilities in risk decisions; 
• provision of risk mitigation resources; 
• internal and external communication on the identified 
risks (reporting) and 
•Qualification of staff for risk management. 
2.2 Framework 
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Mandate and commitment 
For the successful introduction of the risk management the 
management has to: 
•Define and enforce a strategy for risk management 
•Define performance criteria for risk management 
• align the objectives of risk management with the 
strategic objectives of the organisation 
•Ensure compliance with legal requirements 
•Deploy necessary resources 
•Communicate risk management benefits to all 
stakeholders and stakeholders 
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Mandate and commitment 
• What to achieve:  
 Objectives, Performance criteria 
• What should it be achieved with:  
  Resources 
• How to achieve it:  
 Strategy 
• Who should reach it:  
 Responsibilities 
2.2 Framework 
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Context 
1. Understanding the organization/system and its 
constraints 
2. Development of a risk management strategy 
3. Responsibilites 
4. Integration into processes 
5. Deploying Resources 
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Resources 
1. Employees, their skills, experiences and competencies 
2. Required resources 
3. Processes, tools and methods 
4. Documentations 
5. Tools for information and knowledge management 
6. Further training/training 
2.2 Framework 
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2.3 Risk Management Process 
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Risk management: ISO 31000 Process 
2.3 Process 
Process cycle risk treatment Process cycle risk management Information 
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Communication and Consultation 
Communication and consutlation with external and internal 
stakeholders should take place at all stages of the risk 
management process. 
 
Essential information is: 
•Risk 
•Risk cause 
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Establishing the Context 
The context of the risk management must clearly be 
articulated before the risk assessment starts. 
Important aspects are: 
• objective and scope 
• external relationships  
 (e.g. environmental conditions, interfaces) 
• internal relationships of the organization/system  
 (e.g. specifications) 
• requirements for the risk management process 
• risk criteria for the remaining process 
2.3 Process 
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6. Strength/Extent of consequences 
7. Temporal frame 
8. Existing tolerances & redundancies 
9. Potential of detection 
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Risk evaluation 
The evaluation scheme to be applied depends on the 
framework conditions such as: 
• field of application 
• ambient conditions 
• extent of damage/loss 
Usual evaluation criteria are: 
• Likelihood 
• Potential damage/loss 
• Recovery costs 
2.3 Process 
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Risk evaluation - Likelihood / Probability, Scale 
PS Probability Criterion 
0 - 1 improbable/ unlikely < 1% 
So unlikely, that it can be 
assumed that the event 
does not occurs. 
2 - 3 remote 1% - 5% 
Low possibility that an event 
occurs. 
4 - 6 occasional 5% - 50% 
Event will occur in some, but 
less than half of the cases. 
7 - 8  probable  50% - 90% 
Event will occur in more than 
half of the cases. 
9 - 10 frequent > 90% 
Most likely that an event will 
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Risk evaluation – Severity of Potential consequences 
S Severity criterion 
1 Negligible 
No or minor effects occur; the system can fulfill 
his mission without disturbances. 
2 – 3 Limited/ Marginal 
The appearing effects cause functional 
restrictions or working difficulties. They do not 
influence the main mission. 
4 – 6 Severe 
The appearing effects reduce the efficiency and 
capability of the system. 
7 – 8 Very severe 
The appearing effects prevent that the system is 
able to fulfill its main function or mission. 
9 - 10 Catastrophic 
Effects could result in one or more of the 
following: death of human being, permanent 
total damage, irreversible significant 
environmental impact. 
2.3 Process 
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Take Home Messages 





Establishing the Context 
• Objective and scope 
• Risk Criteria 
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Risk management  
– Principles and guidelines 
2. Fundamentals of Risk Management 
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3.1 Introduction 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Risk management: ISO 31000 Process 
3.1 Introduction 
Process cycle risk treatment Process cycle risk management Information 
22.01.2021 
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Folge(n) Folge(n) Impacts 
Consequences 
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Folge(n) Folge(n) Impacts 
Consequences 
Situation: 
 Cause of failure known 
 Resulting consequences unknown 
Result: 
All consequences of a fault 
are identified and analyzed 
 
 Strongly applicable for the     
     analysis of EMI risks 
Procedure: 
 Risk analysis starts at a cause of a  
critical failure and tries to find out  
the consequences  
Example:  
 FMECA (see 3.3.3) 
22.01.2021 
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Folge(n) Folge(n) Impacts 
Consequences 
Situation: 
 Cause of failure unknown 
 Resulting consequence known 
Result: 
All causes of a consequence 
are identified and analyzed 
 
 less applicable for the     
     analysis of EMI risks 
Procedure: 
 Risk analysis starts at unwanted 
consequence and tries to determine  
the causes (all causes)  
Example:  
 FTA (see 3.3.6) 
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Categories of Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
• inductive Methods: 
• Cause of failure known 
• Resulting consequences unknown 
• Example: FMECA (see 3.3.3) 
• deductive Methods:  
• Cause of failure unknown 
• Resulting consequence known 
• Example: FTA (see 3.3.6) 
• explorative Methods 
• Cause of failure unknown 
• Resulting consequences unknown 
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Methods – Categories of Application 
• used for Risk Identification: 
• Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) 
• used for Risk Analysis – Consequences 
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
• HAZOP 
• used for Risk Analysis  – Probability 
• Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
• used for Risk Analysis  – Level of Risk 
• FMECA 
• used for Risk Analysis Evaluation 
• Consequence/Probability Matrix 
 
3.1 Introduction 
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3.2 Methods used for Risk Identification 
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3.2.1 Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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PHL - Overview 
In the Preliminary Hazard List (at minimum), the following 
textual descriptions are given in tabular form: 
• The hazard sources identified 
• Causes and/or triggers of hazards determined 
• Resulting hazards identified 
• Affected operating phase/life cycle phases determined 
• The effects of hazards  
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PHL - Process 
1) Detection of potential sources of interference 
2) Detection of possible coupling paths 
3) Estimation of possible effects 
4) Documentation 
3.2.1 PHL 
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PHL – Example Documentation Sheet 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 
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PHL - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• that it is able to be used when there is limited 
information; 
• it allows risks to be considered very early in the system 
lifecycle. 
Limitations: 
• PHL provides only provisional information; 
• The PHL is neither comprehensive nor provides 
detailed information on risks and how to best prevent 
them. 
3.2.1 PHL 
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PHL – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.2.1: 
Identified and list possible EMI hazards for the system parts 
of the fictional generic infrastructure installed in the building 
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3.2.1 PHL 
PHL - Evaluation 
Method Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) 
Type of 
Method 
























X X X X X 
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3.2.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
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PHA - Overview 
The Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is prepared on the 
basis of the Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) in order to: 
• Evaluate hazard potentials at an early stage 
• Identify all contributing security measures 
• Examine the extent to which the residual risks are 
acceptable 
• and/or to plan strategies to avoid hazards; or 
• used as a basis for further reduction of residual risk 
• by planning further safety measures 
3.2.2 PHA 
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PHA - Process 
1) Detection of potential sources of interference 
2) Detection of possible coupling paths 
3) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
4) Estimation of possible effects 
5) Evaluation of effects 
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PHA - Documentation 
1) Reference Number 




• Emax  r 
3) Possible Location 




5)  Affected Subsystem 
6) Possible Effect 
7) Consequence 
8) Criticality / Severity 
9) Likelihood 
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PHA – Example Documentation Sheet 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 … 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 
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PHA – Example Documentation Sheet (cont.) 
1 … 4 5 5a 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 





Type Distance Attenuation  
3.2.2 PHA 
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PHA – Example Documentation Sheet (cont.) 
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PHA - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• that it is able to be used when there is limited 
information; 
• it allows risks to be considered very early in the system 
lifecycle. 
Limitations: 
• PHA provides only provisional information; 
• The PHA is neither comprehensive nor provides 
detailed information on risks and how to best prevent 
them. 
3.2.2 PHA 
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PHA – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.2.2: 
Identify, list and evaluate possible EMI hazards for the 
system parts of the fictional generic infrastructure installed 
in the building 2A by employing the PHA. 
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3.2.2 PHA 
PHA - Evaluation 
Method Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
Type of 
Method 
























X X X X 
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3.3 Methods used for Risk Analysis 
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3.3.1 HAZard and OPerability study 
(HAZOP) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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HAZOP - Overview 
• The HAZOP is a method for identifying potential safety and 
operational problems of technical systems 
• The HAZOP study must be carried out by a team of experts. 
• An experienced discussion leader systematically guides the 
analysis team through the analysis process by using 
appropriate key or guidewords.  
• The keywords are linked to certain process parameters 
during the discussion in order to determine possible 
deviations from the planned mode of operation. 
• The significance of possible deviations for the system, the 
users and the environment is considered.  
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HAZOP – Team of Experts 
• Moderator or team leader 
• System developer 
• User / Operator 
• EMI or EMC expert 
• Experts on other essential aspects 
3.3.1 HAZOP 
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HAZOP - Process 
1) Preparation 
2) Selection of a process step 
3) Process step attribution 
4) Combination of each attribute of a process part with 
guidewords 
5) Risk identification 
6) Discussion of possible causes and consequences 
7) Development of remedial measures 
8) Continue the analysis with a different guide word, 
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HAZOP - Preparation 
Prior to the workshop in which the analysis is conducted, 
the moderator creates a list with 
• Guidewords and 
• Questions 
which are adapted to the system to be considered. 
3.3.1 HAZOP 
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HAZOP – Process step  
• Example: Energy supply 
• start-up / turning on 
• normal operation 
• full use of the capacity 
• malfunction (e.g. emergency shutdown, insulation 
violation, ground closure) and 
• shut down / Switch off 
• … 
3.3.1 HAZOP 
Source: IEC 61882 
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HAZOP – Guidewords 
• Field exposition 
• Interference signal 
• Malfunction 
• Failure / shutdown 
• Under voltage / over voltage 
• Voltage drop / outrage 
• … 
3.3.1 HAZOP 
Source: IEC 61882 
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HAZOP – Guidewords (attributes) 
• No, not   target function does not take place or  
       is negated 
• More   Quantitative growth, too much is happening 
• Less   Quantitative decrease, too little 
• Both and   In addition, something else happens 
• Partially   Target function is incomplete 
• Reversal   The opposite happens 
3.3.1 HAZOP 
Source: IEC 61882 
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HAZOP - Risk identification  
During a workshop the expert team then discusses whether 
the deviation described by the selected guide word 
represents a problem or danger. 
 
Example question:  
“What is the immediate consequence of a lower output 
voltage of the Side Distribution Frame 2?” 
3.3.1 HAZOP 
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HAZOP - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• a HAZOP study may be conducted as soon as a 
preliminary design of the system has been prepared; 
• methodology for systematic and comprehensive 
analysis of systems and processes; 
• provides solutions for risk management. 
Limitations: 
• A complete system analysis can be very complicated 
and lengthy; 
• The analysis depends heavily on the expertise of the 
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HAZOP – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.3.1: 
Identify, list and evaluate possible EMI hazards for the 
system parts of the fictional generic infrastructure installed 
in the building 5 by employing the HAZOP. 
 
• The task should be handled in groups of 3-4 students. 
• The result shall be documented in a short report 
3.3.1 HAZOP 
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3.3.1 HAZOP 
HAZOP – Evaluation  
Method HAZard and OPerability study (HAZOP) 
Type of 
Method 









Level of Risk 
Evaluation 













X X X 
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3.3.2 Structured What-if Technique 
(SWIFT) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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SWIFT - Overview 
• SWIFT was originally developed as a simpler alternative 
to HAZOP.  
• It is a systematic, team based study, utilizing a set of 
„prompt‟ words or phrases that is used by the facilitator 
within a workshop to stimulate participants to identify risks.  
• The facilitator and team use standard „what-if‟ type 
phrases in combination with the prompts to investigate 
how a system, will be affected by deviations from normal 
operations and behavior. 
• SWIFT is normally applied at more of a systems level with 
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SWIFT – Team of Experts 
• Moderator or team leader 
• System developer 
• User / Operator 
• EMI or EMC expert 
• Experts on other essential aspects 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT - Process 
1) Preparation 
2) System description and specifications 
3) Capture of previously known risks 
4) Selection of a process step 
5) Discussion of deviations 
6) Risk identification 
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SWIFT - Preparation 
Prior to the workshop in which the analysis is conducted, 
the moderator creates a list with 
• „Prompt‟ words, 
• Phrases and 
• Questions 
which are adapted to the system to be considered. 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – Process step  
• Example: Energy supply 
• start-up / turning on 
• normal operation 
• full use of the capacity 
• malfunction (e.g. emergency shutdown, insulation 
violation, ground closure) and 
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SWIFT – ‘Prompt’ Words 
• Field exposition 
• Interference signal 
• Malfunction 
• Failure / shutdown 
• Under voltage / over voltage 
• Voltage drop / outrage 
• … 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – Phrases 
• What if,...? 
• What would happen if...? 
• How could...? 
• Could anyone...? 
• Could something...? 
• Anyone ever...? 





Page 49 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
SWIFT – Questions (examples) 
• What if, building 1 would be irradiated by an EMI source 
(M = X/type) on location P? 
• Could someone place an EMI source (M = X/type) in 
building 1? 
• What would happen if subsystem S had a malfunction? 
• What would happen if subsystem S failed/is shutdown? 
• Could someone generate a wrong control signal on the 
signal line ? 
• …? 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – Capture of previously known risks 
• Known risks 
• previous experiences and EMI events 
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SWIFT – Risk identification 
At the end of each expert discussion (workshop) 
• identified risks (including their consequences) are 
summarized; and 
• existing options to control risks considered. 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – Evaluation of remediation measures 
The expert's team: 
• Checks whether the discussed controls are suitable and 
effective 
• Prepares a statement on the effectiveness of risk controls 
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SWIFT - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• it is widely applicable to all forms of physical plant or 
system; 
• it needs minimal preparation by the team; 
• it is relatively rapid and the major hazards and risks 
quickly become apparent within the workshop session; 
• the study is „systems orientated‟ and allows participants 
to look at the system response to deviations rather than 
just examining the consequences of component failure; 
• it can be used to identify opportunities for improvement 
of processes and systems; 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT - Strengths and limitations (cont.) 
Limitations: 
• it needs an experienced and capable facilitator to be 
efficient; 
• careful preparation is needed so that the workshop 
team‟s time is not wasted; 
• if the workshop team does not have a wide enough 
experience base or if the prompt system is not 
comprehensive, some risks or hazards may not be 
identified; 
• the high-level application of the technique may not 
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SWIFT – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.3.2: 
With the help of SWIFT, the possible EMI hazards for the 
system parts installed in building 1 of the fictional 
infrastructure should to be identified and recorded. 
 
• The task should be handled in groups of 3-4 students. 
• The result shall be documented in a short report 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
Page 56 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
SWIFT - Evaluation 
Method Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT) 
Type of 
Method 









Level of Risk 
Evaluation 













X X X 
22.01.2021 
29 
Page 57 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
www.geml.uni-hannover.de 
3.3.3 Failure Mode Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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FMECA - Overview 
• The FMECA identifies the possible types of failure (individual 
errors) of a module/system and analyzes their impact. 
• The system to be considered is subdivided into "sensible" units. 
• The impact of a failure type can be evaluated with regard to: 
• Safety (severity, probability of failure, detectability) 
• Reliability (subsequent failures, vulnerabilities, redundancy) 
• Testability (detectability, test depth of the built-in test) 
• Material durability (detectability, localizability of failures, impact on 
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FMECA - Process 
Evaluate each failure mode and  
assign a severity classification category 
Identify failure  
detection methods 
Identify corrective measures  
for failure modes 
Dokumentation 
Define the  
 system 
Construct system  
structure model 
Identify potential failure  
modes & their causes 
Source: MIL-STD-1629A 
            IEC 60812 
3.3.3 FMECA 
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FMECA - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• widely applicable; 
• allows the identification of component errors, their 
causes and effects, 
• Clear presentation. 
Limitations: 
• can only be used to identify single failure modes, not 
combinations of failure modes; 
• unless adequately controlled and focused, the studies 
can be time consuming and costly; 
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3.3.3 FMECA 
FMECA - Evaluation 
Method Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Type of 
Method 









Level of Risk 
Evaluation 













X X X 
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3.3.4 Threat Scenario, Effect and 
Criticality Analysis (TSECA) 
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TSECA - Overview 
• The Threat Scenario, Effect and Criticality Analysis (TSECA) is 
an inductive Method for EMI risk analysis based on the 
methodology of failure mode, effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA).  
• The basic structure of TSECA is similar the structure of the 
FMECA as described in MIL-STD-1629A 
• In contrast to the FMECA the TSECA has been modified to be 
capable to consider external causes of risks. 
3.3.4 TSECA 
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TSECA - Process 
Evaluate each failure mode and  
assign a severity classification category 
Identify failure  
detection methods 
Identify corrective measures  
for failure modes 
Documentation 
Define the  
 EMI threat scenario 
Construct scenario interaction model  
and system structure model 
Determine effects  
and failure modes 
3.3.4 TSECA 
Source: F. Sabath and H. Garbe, "Concept of stochastic modeling for High-Power Electromagnetics (HPEM) risk analysis at system level," 2013 IEEE 
International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Denver, CO, 2013, pp. 401-406, doi: 10.1109/ISEMC.2013.6670446 
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TSECA - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• widely applicable; 
• capable to consider external causes of risks, 
• Clear presentation. 
Limitations: 
• can only be used to identify single failure modes, not 
combinations of failure modes; 
• unless adequately controlled and focused, the studies 
can be time consuming and costly; 
• they can be difficult and tedious for complex multi-
layered systems. 
3.3.4 TSECA 
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3.3.4 TSECA 
TSECA - Evaluation 
Method Threat Scenario, Effect and Criticality Analysis (TSECA) 
Type of 
Method 









Level of Risk 
Evaluation 













X X X 
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3.3.5 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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ETA - Overview 
• ETA is an inductive and  graphical technique for representing 
the mutually exclusive sequences of events following an 
initiating event according to the functioning/not functioning of 
the various systems designed to mitigate its consequences.  
• It can be applied both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
• By fanning out like a tree, ETA is able to represent the 
aggravating or mitigating events in response to the initiating 
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ETA - Process 
• ETA starts with an initiating event (e.g. component error) 
• Starting from the initiating event, possible subsequent 
states are displayed. Each branch represents the 
functioning or failure of a component/assembly. 
• The paths are weighted with their probability of 
occurrence. 
• The probability of each path passing through the tree 
represents the probability that all events in this path will 
be. 
3.3.5 ETA 
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ETA - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• Represents follow-up events and their impact on the 
overall function; 
• allows you to view temporal dependencies and domino 
effects. 
• Graphic representation of event sequences 
Limitations: 
• need to identify initiating events; 
• ETA can only view function or failure, time-delayed 
effects or recovery operations cannot be mapped. 
• Only functional dependencies are recorded. 
3.3.5 ETA 
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3.3.5 ETA 
ETA - Evaluation 
Method Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Type of 
Method 









Level of Risk 
Evaluation 













X X X 
22.01.2021 
37 
Page 73 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
www.geml.uni-hannover.de 
3.3.6 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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FTA - Overview 
• Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive method. 
• FTA is a technique for identifying and analyzing factors 
that can contribute to a specified undesired event (called 
the “top event”). Causal factors are deductively identified, 
organized in a logical manner and represented pictorially 
in a tree diagram which depicts causal factors and their 
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FTA - Process 
• The top event to be analyzed is defined. 
• Starting with the top event, the possible immediate causes 
or failure modes leading to the top event are identified. 
• Each of these causes/fault modes is analyzed to identify 
how their failure could be caused. 
• Stepwise identification of undesirable system operation is 
followed to successively lower system levels until further 
analysis becomes unproductive. 
• Where probabilities can be assigned to base events the 
probability of the top event may be calculated. 
3.3.6 FTA 
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FTA - Process 
Source: IEC 60300-3-9 
            IEC 2063/09 
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FTA - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• a systematic approach that facilitates the analysis of 
complex systems with many interfaces; 
• Logic analyses enable the identification of error 
propagation paths in complex systems 
Limitations: 
• the FTA is a static analysis; Time dependencies cannot 
be considered 
• FTA can only map binary states 
• FTA cannot analyze "domino effects" or dependencies. 
• Only one top event can be considered for each fault 
tree. 
3.3.6 FTA 
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3.3.6 FTA 
FTA - Evaluation  
Method Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Type of 
Method 









Level of Risk 
Evaluation 













X X X 
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3.3.7 Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
 
Page 80 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
BTA - Overview 
• Bow tie analysis is a simple diagrammatic way of describing 
and analyzing the pathways of a risk from causes to 
consequences.  
• It can be considered to be a combination of the thinking of a 
fault tree analyzing the cause of an event (represented by the 
knot of a bow tie) and an event tree analyzing the 
consequences.  
• The focus of the bow tie is on the barriers between the causes 
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BTA - Process 
a) A particular risk is identified for analysis and represented as the 
central knot of a bow tie. 
b) Causes of the event (Sources of Risk) are listed on the left side. 
c) The mechanism by which the source of risk leads to the critical 
event is identified. 
d) Lines are drawn between each cause and the event forming the 
left-hand side of the bow tie. Factors which might lead to 
escalation can be identified and included in the diagram. 
e) Barriers which should prevent each cause leading to the 
unwanted consequences can be shown as vertical bars across 
the line.  
f) Where there were factors which might cause escalation, barriers 
to escalation can also be represented.  
3.3.7 BTA 
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BTA - Process 
Source: IEC 60300-3-9 
            IEC 2069/09 
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BTA - Process 
g) On the right-hand side of the bow tie different potential 
consequences of the risk are identified and lines drawn to 
radiate out from the risk event to each potential consequence. 
h) Barriers to the consequence are depicted as bars across the 
radial lines.  
i) Management functions which support controls (such as training 
and inspection) can be shown under the bow tie and linked to 
the respective control. 
3.3.7 BTA 
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BTA - Process 
Source: IEC 60300-3-9 
            IEC 2069/09 
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BTA - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• it is simple to understand and gives a clear pictorial 
representation of the problem; 
• it focuses attention on controls which are supposed to 
be in place for both prevention and mitigation and their 
effectiveness; 
• it can be used for desirable consequences; 
• it does not need a high level of expertise to use. 
Disadvantages: 
• The necessity of simultaneous occurrence of several 
causes cannot be illustrated. 
• There is a risk of too much simplification of complex 
contexts. 
3.3.7 BTA 
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BTA – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.3.7: 
With the help of BTA, the possible EMI hazards for the 
system parts installed in building 1 of the fictional 
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3.3.7 BTA 
BTA - Evaluation  
Method Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) 
Type of 
Method 









Level of Risk 
Evaluation 













X X X X 
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3.4 Methods used for Risk Evaluation 
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Objective of  Risk Evaluation 
3.4 Risk Evaluation 
(1) To classify identified risks in 
• Risks that can be tolerated 
• Risks that require further analysis 
• Risks that need to be addressed/mitigated 
(2) To priories necessary risk management measures 
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Risk Classification 
3.4 Risk Evaluation 
Classification of identified risks by comparison  
• defined risk characteristics and assessment criteria  
(see 2.3 Establishing the Context), with: 
• the risk parameters determined in the risk analysis; 
22.01.2021 
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Risk Evaluation 
3.4 Risk Evaluation 
Usual evaluation criteria are: 
1) probability of occurrence 
2) Severity / extent of damage 
3) Potential of detection of hazed / error recognition 
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Anomaly IEMI Risk 
3.4 Risk Evaluation 
• Assumption of IEMI attack/IEMI exposure. 
• The likelihood of IEMI attack/IEMI exposure is not 
considered. 
• This is dependent on non-technical aspects and can be 
determined separately if required. 
As Probability/Frequently, the damage 
(effect, impact) occurs when the system is 
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3.4.1 Risk Index 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Risk Index - Overview 
• A risk index is a semi-quantitative measure of risk which is 
an estimate derived using a scoring approach using 
ordinal scales. 
• Risk indices can be used to rate a series of risks using 
similar criteria so that they can be compared. 
• Risk indices are essentially a qualitative approach to 
ranking and comparing risks. While numbers are used, 
this is simply to allow for manipulation. 
3.4.1 Risk Index 
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Example - Risk Priority Index (RPI)  
3.4.1 Risk Index 
 
RPI = S  P  D 
 
• By calculating the risk priority number (RPI), an attempt is 
made to establish a ranking of the risks. 
• 1 ≤ RPI ≤ 1000 
• There is the claim that the RPI, at least in comparison with 
other RPI of the same risk analysis, allows a statement in 
the sense of better/worse. 
S – Severity of damage   [0, 10] 
P – Probability of occurrence   [0, 10] 
D – Potential of detection   [0, 10] 
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Risk Index - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• indices can provide a good tool for ranking different 
risks; 
• they allow multiple factors which affect the level of risk 
to be incorporated into a single numerical score for the 
level of risk. 
Limitations: 
• if the process (model) and its output are not well 
validated, the results may be meaningless.  
• The fact that the output is a numerical value for risk 
may be misinterpreted and misused, for example in 
subsequent cost/benefit analysis; 
3.4.1 Risk Index 
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3.4.2 Risk Matrix  
(Consequence/ Probability Matrix) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Risk Matrix - Overview 
• Classification of the potential extent of damage 
• Classification of the probability of occurrence 
• Representation of the potential extent of damage 
(vertical) and the associated probability of occurrence 
(horizontal) in matrix form. 
• Classification of fields into risk classes: 
• Red:  high risk/determined risk is not acceptable 
• Yellow:  significant risk/risk cannot be taken easily,  
 further analysis is required 
• Green:  low risk/risk is acceptable 
3.4.2 Risk Matrix 
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Risk Matrix - Process 













Catastrophic II I I I 
Severe II II I I 
Limited/ 
Marginal 
III III II I 
Negligible III III III II 
improbable/ 
unlikely 
occasional probable frequent 
probability of occurrence 
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Risk Matrix - Strengths and limitations 
Strengths: 
• Relatively easy to use; 
• Enables rapid classification of risks in significance 
classes. 
Limitations: 
• The structure of the matrix should be adapted to the 
scope. It is therefore difficult to create a general 
classification for all areas of application. 
• it is difficult to define the scales unambiguously. 
• The application is always subjectively influenced. 
• Risks cannot be summarized. 
• It is difficult to compare different risks with different effects 
3.4.2 Risk Matrix 
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3.5 Comparison of Methods 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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3.5 Comparison of Methods 








Consequence Probability Level of risk 
Brainstorming SA NA NA NA NA 
Strukturierte 
Interviews 
SA NA NA NA NA 
Delphi Technik 
(Expertengruppe) 
SA NA NA NA NA 
Preliminary 
Hazard List (PHL) 




SA A NA NA NA 
SA Strongly applicable. A Applicable. NA Not Applicable. 
Source: ISO 31010:2009 (Annex A) 
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3.5 Comparison of Methods 





Risk Analysis Risk 
Evaluation 




SA SA A A A 
Hazard analysis 
and critical control 
point (HACCP) 




SA SA SA SA SA 
Scenario analysis SA SA A A A 
SA Strongly applicable. A Applicable. NA Not Applicable. 
Source: ISO 31010:2009 (Annex A) 
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3.5 Comparison of Methods 








Consequence Probability Level of risk 
Root cause 
analysis (RCA) 




A SA A A NA 




SA SA SA SA SA 
SA Strongly applicable. A Applicable. NA Not Applicable. 
Source: ISO 31010:2009 (Annex A) 
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3.5 Comparison of Methods 








Consequence Probability Level of risk 
Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) 
A NA SA A A 
Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) 




A SA SA A A 
Cause-and-effect 
analysis 
SA SA NA NA NA 
Bow tie analysis NA A SA SA A 
SA Strongly applicable. A Applicable. NA Not Applicable. 
Source: ISO 31010:2009 (Annex A) 
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3.5 Comparison of Methods 
Methods used for risk assessment 
SA Strongly applicable. A Applicable. NA Not Applicable. 








Consequence Probability Level of risk 
Markov analysis A SA NA NA NA 
Monte Carlo 
simulation 
NA NA NA NA SA 
Bayesian statistics 
and Bayes Nets 
NA SA NA NA SA 
Risk indices A SA SA A SA 
Consequence/ 
probability matrix 
SA SA SA SA A 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
Definition EMI Scenario 
The EMI scenario includes the description and 
spatial arrangement of possible EMI sources, 
the target system under consideration, and 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
EMI Scenario: General Information 
Aspect Remark 
Reference Number EMI scenario identification number 
Label / Name Label / Name of the scenario EMI 
22.01.2021 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
EMI Scenario: Target System 
Aspect Remark 
Label / Name  
Target System 
Label / Name of the target system to be analyzed 
Demanded Function Description of the main and possibly important secondary functions 
Demanded Performance  Specified performancs power as well as tolerated performance 
limits (collapses) or required minimum performance 
Working Conditions Description of the operating states to be examined (e.g. operation, 
maintenance, repair) 
Operating Conditions Description of essential operating conditions (e.g. environment, 
stress factors) 
Technology Characterization of technology level and/or technology 
Structure of the System Description of the structure of the system 
(e.g. subsystems, assemblies, functional units), as well as their 
functional relationships and interfaces 
Location / Spatial 
Distribution 
spatial arrangement or distribution of the target system 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
EMI Scenario:  Vicinity of Target System 
Aspect Remark 
Accesibility Description of accessibility to the target system/access 
zones/drawing or illustration if necessary 
Possible coupling paths Description of possible coupling paths of electromagnetic energy. 
Scattering Objects Scattering objects in the vicinity of the target system. 
22.01.2021 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
EMI Scenario: Potential Offender 
Aspect Remark 
Type Internal / external offender 
Access Probability that the potential attacker has access to an area. 
Knowledge Probability that the potential attacker has access to the knowledge required 
to construction and operation the HPEM source. 
Financial 
Recourses 
Probability that the potential offender has access to funds of a given 
amount. 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
EMI Scenario: HPEM Source 
Aspect Remark 
Availability of Technology Availability characterizes the effort involved in obtaining the HPEM 
source or its components 
Bandwidth Bandwidth of the emitted field signal  
Frequency Range Frequency band that encompasses the center frequency of the 
HPEM source 
Frequency Agility Tunability of the HPEM source 
Volume / Mobility Overall design size of the HPEM source 
operating time Duration of the exposure / threat 
Possible Locations Locations at which the HPEM source could be operated 
Likelihood of Occurrence Probability that the HPEM source is used by the potential offender 
and occurs at the potential location. 
22.01.2021 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
Availability of Technology, Scale 
AVC Availability Description 
1 of-the-shelf 
available in the commercial 
market-place (e.g. department 




available in specialty stores; can 




available only in specialized 
trading companies; acquisition is 




Limited acquisition under 
conditions or to registered buyer, 




trade or acquisition prohibited by 
law 
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0,00 < BF  
0,01 
0,00 < br  
1,01 
sinusoidal signal,   
pulse-modulated sinusoidal. 
ME Mesoband 
0,01 < BF  
1,00 




1,00 < BF  
1,63 
3 < br  10 Chirp 
HE Hyperband 
1,63 < BF  
2,00 
10 < br   
gaussian pulse,  
bipolar pulse, double 
exponential pulse 
Source: IEC 61000-2-13 
22.01.2021 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
Frequency Bands 
Radar Nomenclature ITU Nomenclature 
Band (Radar) Frequency Range Frequency Range Band (ITU 
HF 3 MHz  fc< 30 MHz 3 MHz  fc< 30 MHz HF 
VHF 30 MHz  fc< 300 MHz 30 MHz  fc< 300 MHz VHF 
UHF 0,3 GHz  fc< 1 GHz 
0,3 GHz  fc< 3 GHz UHF 
L 1 GHz  fc< 2 GHz 
S 2 GHz  fc< 4 GHz 
3 GHz  fc< 30 GHz 
 
SHF 
C 4 GHz  fc< 8 GHz 
X 8 GHz  fc< 12 GHz 
Ku 12 GHz  fc< 18 GHz 
K 18 GHz  fc< 27 GHz 
Source: IEEE Std 521-2002 
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1 fixed frequency f = 0 
The source works on a 
fixed (center) frequency 
and is not tunable. 
2 low |f / fc|  1% 
The (center) frequency 
can be tuned up to 1%. 
3 moderate |f / fc|  10% 
The (center) frequency 
can be tuned up to 10%. 
4 high |f / fc|  25% 
The (center) frequency 
can be tuned up to 25%. 
5 Very high |f / fc| > 25% 
The (center) frequency 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
Usable Volume of possible Platforms 
Plattform Usable Volume 
40´ Container 77 m3 
20´ Container 38 m3 
Light Truck (up to 7,5 t) 9 – 42 m3 
Van / Minivan 2 - 6 m3 
Suitcase < 0,2 m3 
Briefcase < 0,02 m3 
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4.1 EMI Scenario 
Volume / Mobility, Scale 
Level 
(M) 
Mobility Volume Example 
1 stationary > 77m3 
Fixed 
installation 
2 transportable 10 - 77m3 
light truck –  
40‗ Container 
3 mobile 0,2 – 10 m3 car / van 
4 very mobile 0,02 – 0,2 m3 briefcase 
5 highly mobile < 0,02 m3 beverage can 
22.01.2021 
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EMI Scenario: Potential Offender 
Aspect Remark 
Type Internal / external offender 
Access Probability that the potential attacker has access to an area. 
Knowledge Probability that the potential attacker has access to the knowledge required 
to construction and operation the HPEM source. 
Financial 
Recourses 
Probability that the potential offender has access to funds of a given 
amount. 
4.2 Generic Offender 
22.01.2021 
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EMI Scenario: Potential Offender 
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outside inside Definition 
1o free X 
Area of the general public (outdoors) accessible to each 
person without special effort. 
1i free X 
Area of the general public (indoors) accessible to each person 
without special effort. 
2o monitored  X Area of the general public whose access is or can be monitored. 
2i monitored X Area in a building whose access is or can be monitored. 
3o controlled X Outdoor area that can only be entered after an identity check 
3i controlled X 
Area in a building that can only be entered after an identity 
check 
4o restricted X 
Outdoor control / restricted area that can only be accessed by 
authorized persons or after a pocket check. 
4i restricted X 
Control / restricted area in the building, which can only be 
entered by authorized persons or after a pocket check. 
4.2 Generic Offender 
22.01.2021 
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4.2 Generic Offender 
Generic Offender: Access (example) 
AZ Accessibility Index of Probability  
(internal offender) 














monitored  9 
frequent 
(90 - 97%) 
8 
probable 





(50 – 75%) 
6 
occasional 





(12 – 25%) 
3 
remote 
(2 – 5%) 
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EMI Scenario: Potential Offender 
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Educational background of radical Islamists (1) 
4.2 Generic Offender 
Source: D. Gambetta and S. Hertog, Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?, Archives of European Sociology,  
 Volume 50 / Issue 2 / August 2009, pp. 201–230, doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975609990129 
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Educational background of radical Islamists (2) 
4.2 Generic Offender 
Source: D. Gambetta and S. Hertog, Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?, Archives of European Sociology,  
 Volume 50 / Issue 2 / August 2009, pp. 201–230, doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975609990129 
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Educational background of radical Islamists (3) 
4.2 Generic Offender 
Source: D. Gambetta and S. Hertog, Engineers of Jihad, Sociology Working Papers, Paper Number 2007-10, University of Oxford  
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Educational background delinquent (USA) 
4.2 Generic Offender 
Source: L. Lochner and E. Moretti, The E®ect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports,  
  American Economic Review   94(1), 2004 
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EMI Scenario: Potential Offender 
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4.2 Generic Offender 




















KD – Knowledge Level 
1 - novice 2 - skilled 3 - specialist 4 - graduate 5 - expert 
22.01.2021 
16 
Page 31 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
4.2 Generic Offender 
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4.2 Generic Offender 
Generic Offender: Knowledge 
Knowledge Level Index of Probability  
general knowledge Novice 1 9  
frequent 
(90 - 97%) 
basic understanding  Skilled 2 7 
probable 
(50 – 75%) 
specialized knowledge  
and expertise 
Specialist 3 6 
occasional 
(25 – 50%) 
academic knowledge  
and professional expertise 
Graduate 4 4 
occasional 
(5 – 12%) 
expert knowledge  
and profound expertise 
Expert 5 3 
remote 
(2 – 5%) 
22.01.2021 
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EMI Scenario: Potential Offender 













Page 34 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
4.2 Generic Offender 
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4.2 Generic Offender 
Gross Financial Assets (Germany, 2013) 
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4.2 Generic Offender 
Generic Offender: Financial Recourses 
Available financial recources Index of Probability  
< 1.000 € Low 1 9  
Frequent 
(90 - 97%) 
1.000 – 10.000 € Moderate 2 6 
occasional 
(25 – 50%) 
10.000 – 100.000 € Increased 3 4 
occasional 
(5 – 12%) 
100.000 – 1.000.000 € High 4 2 
remote 
(1 – 2%) 
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Principal Structure 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
22.01.2021 
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4.3.1 Primary Energy Source 
Primary Energy Source 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
24 V Accumulator-Package 
•  power supply units  
•  power transformer 
 
•  accumulator / batteries 
•  HV-Capacitors 
 
•  piezoelectric elements 
22.01.2021 
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Energy Density vs. Discharge Time 
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Evaluation Primary Energy Sources 
4.3.1 Primary Energy Source 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
Lithium-ion accumulator systems are increasingly being used as 
primary energy sources of mobile HPEM sources. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 2 
The design of a primary energy source consisting of lithium-ion 
cells requires knowledge at the level of a hobby electrician. 
- Assembling KA = 2 
The construction and assembling of a primary energy source 
requires knowledge at the level of a hobby electrician. 
- Operation KO = 1 
For the operation of primary energy source consisting of lithium-
ion cells, only general basic understanding is required. 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 
The required components (lithium-ion cells) are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- Primary Energy Source AVS = 1 - 3 
Lithium ion batteries of various output voltages and capacities are 
available in free trade, specialized trade and commercial 
specialized trade. 
Costs Cexp = 1 
Simple lithium-ion accumulators can be realized for less than 
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4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
Pulsed Power Source 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
• DC/DC Converter 
 
• Marx Generator 
• Tesla Transformer 
• XRAM Generator 
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DC/DC Converter 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
input voltage: 24V DC 
input current: 600 mA 
 
output voltage: 0 - 30 kV 
output current: 250 A 
Dimensions 
High:   43 mm 
Width: 120 mm 
Length: 185 mm 
Cost: ~ €1,000 
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Marx Generator: Functional Principle 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
Capacitor bank in which the individual stages 
• be loaded in parallel 
 low charging voltage UP 
• be unloaded serially 
 Summing of charging voltage UL = N  UP 
22.01.2021 
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Marx Generator 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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Marx Generator (Example) 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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Evaluation Marx Generator 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
The Marx Generator is a high-voltage pulse source consisting of  
multiple compression stages with capacitive energy storage and 
closing switches. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 2 
The design of a Marx Generator requires knowledge at the level of 
a hobby electrician. 
- Assembling KA = 2 
The construction and assembling of a Marx Generator requires 
knowledge at the level of a hobby electrician. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
For the operation of a Marx Generator only an instruction in the 
handling is necessary. (general knowledge to basic 
understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 The required components are available from specialist retailers. 
- Pulsed Power Source AVS = 3 
Marx generators are available in commercial retailers for output 
voltages up to the MV range. 
Costs Cexp = 1 - 3 
Simple Marx generators can be build for less than €1,000. High-
performance Marx generators are offered for up to €100,000 by 
commercial retailers. 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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Tesla Transformer: Functional Principle 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
Transformer which secondary side  
• Is operated in resonance: 
 overvoltage 
• is weakly coupled to the primary side 
 voltage decoupling 
 short-circuit current capability 
22.01.2021 
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Tesla Transformer 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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Pulsed Tesla Transformer 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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Evaluation Tesla Transformer 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
The Tesla  Transformer is a high-voltage pulse source, with 
inductive energy transmission and downstream capacitive 
energy storage. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 2 
The design of a Tesla  Transformer requires knowledge at the level 
of a hobby electrician. 
- Assembling KA = 2 
The construction and assembling of a Tesla  Transformer requires 
knowledge at the level of a hobby electrician. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
For the operation of a Tesla  Transformer  only an instruction in the 
handling is necessary. (general knowledge to basic 
understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 The required components are available from specialist retailers. 
- Pulsed Power Source AVS = 2 - 3 
Simple kits for Tesla Transformers for output voltages up to the kV 
range are available in specialist stores. 
Costs Cexp = 1 - 3 
Simple Tesla Transformers can be build  for less than €1,000. 
High-performance Marx generators are offered for up to €100,000 
by commercial retailers. 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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XRAM Generator: Functional Principle 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
Bank of inductances in which the individual stages 
• be loaded serially 
 low loading current IP 
• be unloaded in parallel 
 summing of loading current IL = N  IP 
• main challenge: 
• synchronization of opening (loading circuit) and closing 
(load circuit) switches 
22.01.2021 
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XRAM Generator 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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Evaluation XRAM Generator 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
The XRAM Generator is a high-current pulse source with 
inductive energy storage. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 4 The design of an XRAM generator requires academic skills. 
- Assembling KA = 3 
The construction and assembling of a an XRAM generator, 
knowledge at the level of a specialist (e.g. craftsman or 
technician) is required. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
For the operation of a XRAM Generator only an instruction in the 
handling is necessary. (general knowledge to basic 
understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 
The required components (lithium-ion cells) are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- Pulsed Power Source AVS = 0 XRAM generators are currently not offered on the market. 
Costs Cexp = 2 - 3 
The cost of building XRAM Generators is in the range 10.000 - 
100.000 € 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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Avalanche Pulsed Generator: Functional Principle 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
1. Diode is polarized in the blocking 
direction 
2. If a certain blocking voltage is 
exceeded, a steep current rise 
occurs (avalanche breakthrough) 






















- Limitation of voltage per  
   element ca. 1kV 
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Avalanche Pulsed Generator 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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SOS-Module: Functional Principle 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
1. During positive half-wave diode is conductive 
2. At the beginning of the negative half-wave there is still a charge 
carrier of the barrier layer 
3. After the charge carriers were cleared the diode blocks 
 Diode acts as opening switch - Limitation of voltage per  
   element ca. 1kV 
t
I
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4.3 EMI Sources 












FPM 1-N 1 kV 1-5 ns 2 - 5 ns 500 kHz 100x100x30 4 
FPM 5-N 5 kV 1-5 ns 2 - 5 ns 300 kHz 200x120x60 4 
FPM 10-N 10 kV 1-5 ns 2 - 5 ns 100 kHz 200x120x60 4 
FPM 30-N 30 kV 1-5 ns 2 - 3 ns 10 kHz 200x120x60 4 
FPM 50-N 50 kV 1-5 ns 2 - 3 ns 1 kHz 240x160x80 4 
FPM 1-P 1 kV 0,1-1 ns 0.2 - 3 ns 500 kHz 100x100x30 4 
FPM 5-P 5 kV 0,1-1 ns 0.2 - 3 ns 300 kHz 200x120x60 4 
FPM 10-P 10 kV 0,1-1 ns 1 - 2 ns 100 kHz 200x120x60 4 
FPM 30-P 30 kV  0,1-1 ns 1 - 2 ns 10 kHz  200x120x60 4 
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4.3 EMI Sources 











SOS + FID 
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Evaluation Semiconductor Pulsed Power Sources 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
Semiconductor pulse generators are high-voltage pulse sources 
based on rapidly opening and/or closing semiconductor switches. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 4 
The design of a semiconductor pulse generator requires 
academic training. 
- Assembling KA = 2 – 3 
The construction of a semiconductor pulse generator requires 
capabilities at the level of a specialist or an experienced hobby 
electrician. 
- Operation KO = 1 -2 
For the operation of a semiconductor pulse generator  only an 
instruction in the handling is necessary. (general knowledge to 
basic understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 
The required components and modules, in particular the 
semiconductor switches, are available from specialist retailers. 
- Pulsed Power Source AVS = 3 
In commercial trade, simple semiconductors pulse generators for 
output voltages up to 50 kV and pulse repetition rates up to 1 MHz 
are available. 
Costs Cexp = 1 - 3 
Simple semiconductor pulse generators can be build for less than 
1,000 €. High-performance semiconductor pulse generators for up 
to €100,000 are offered in commercial retailers. 
4.3.2 Pulsed Power Source 
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Power Volume Ratio of Pulse Power Sources 
Source: E. Schamiloglu, R. J. Barker, M. Gundersen, and A. A. Neuber. Modern pulsed power: Charlie Martin and beyond.  
             In Proceedings of the IEEE, 92(7):1014–1020, July 2004, doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2004.829058 
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Example: RADAN 




tr  =  1 ns,  
Uout  =  290 kV 
Iout  =  2 kA 
PRF  =  Single:  
  1-10 p/min  
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Example: SNL Z-Machine 
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Example: SNL Z-Machine 
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4.3.3 RF-Modulator 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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4.3.3 RF-Modulator 
RF-Modulator 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 









• Line Oscillator 
• Switched Oscillator 
• Antenna Oscillator 
• Pulse sources (without  
RF modulator ) / UWB sources 
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4.3.3.1 Virtual Cathode Oscillator 
(VIRCATOR) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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4.3.3.1 VIRCATOR 



















+ 1  
Resonator 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠  
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4.3.3.1 VIRCATOR 
VIRCATOR (axial type) 
Source: C. Möller, PhD-Thesis Design and Experiments with High-Power Microwave Sources, Stockholm 2012 
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4.3.3.1 VIRCATOR 
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4.3.3.1 VIRCATOR 
VIRCATOR (radial type) 
Source: Moller, C, et al., "Proof of Principle Experiments on Direct Generation of the Mode in a Coaxial Vircator,"  
              IEEE Transactions on  Plasma Science,vol.38, no.1, pp.26,31, Jan. 2010 
Radius Cathode = 68 mm 
Radius Annode  = 53 mm 
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Evaluation VIRCATOR (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology VIRCATORS are vacuum electron tubes. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 4 The design of a VIRCATOR requires academic training 
- Assembling KA = 3 
The construction and assembling of a VIRCATOR, knowledge at 
the level of a specialist (e.g. craftsman or technician) is required. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
Depending on the technology readiness level of the built-up 
VIRCATOR, only an instruction in handling is necessary for its 
operation. (general knowledge to basic understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 – 3 
The most of the required components are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 0 VIRCATORS are currently not on sale. 
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Evaluation VIRCATOR (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility 
M = 3 
M = 4 
M = 5 
UHF-Band VIRCATOR 
L-Band VIRCATOR 
S-Band and C-Band VIRCATOR 
As a rule of thumb, the outer diameter of an axial VIRCATOR is 
greater than the wavelength (ra  l/2). 
In the coaxial design, the diameter of the VIRCATOR is in the 
range of twice the wavelength (ra   l). 
Frequency Range UHF, L, S, C fRF = 0,3 - 10 GHz  
Max. Power Output Pmax  1 GW 
Efficiency h  15 % 
4.3.3.1 VIRCATOR 
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4.3.3.2 Magnetron 
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Magnetron: Example 1 
Source: George B. Collins, editor. Microwave Magnetrons, Radiation  
 Laboratory Series 6. McGraw Hill, January 1948. 
Source: J. Benford. History and future of the relativistic magnetron. In  
 Origins and Evolution of the Cavity Magnetron (CAVMAG),  
 2010 International Conference on the, pages 40–45, April 2010 
4.3.3.2 Magnetron 
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Output Power:  1000W 
Operating Frequency: 2,455 GHz 
Anode Voltage :  4,0 KV 
Antenna:  30 mm 
Cost: 50 € 
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Output Power:  7,5 MW 
Operating Frequency: 2,998 GHz 
Anode Voltage :  4,0 KV 
Source: e2v; Datenblatt MG8076 
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Evaluation Magnetron (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology VIRCATORS are vacuum electron tubes. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 4 The design of a Magnetron requires academic training 
- Assembling KA = 3 
The construction and assembling of a Magnetron, knowledge at 
the level of a specialist (e.g. craftsman or technician) is required. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
Only an instruction in handling is necessary for the operation of a 
Magnetron. (general knowledge to basic understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2  The required components are available from specialist retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 1 - 2 
Magnetrons up to the MW power range are very good available on 
the free market. 
Costs Cexp = 1 - 3 
Magnetrons of low power level are available as components for 
household microwaves for approx. €100. 
4.3.3.2 Magnetron 
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Evaluation Magnetron (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility 
M = 3 - 4 
M = 5 
UHF-Band Magnetron 
L-, S-Band and C-Band Magnetron 
As a thumb rule, the outer diameter of a magnetron is 1, 5 times 
the wavelength. (ra   0.75 l)  
The magnetron height is in the range of 0.6-2 times the 
wavelength. 
Frequency Range UHF, L, S, C, X, .. fRF = 0,3 - 300 GHz  
Max. Power Output 
Pmax  10 MW 




h  80 % 
h h  50 % 
 
h h  40 % 
Low power conventional Magnetron 
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4.3.3.3 Magnetically Insulated Line 
Oscillator (MILO) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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𝑈𝑞  𝐵 
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MILO (Example US AFRL) 
4.3.3.3 MILO 
𝑟𝑎 ≥ 0,38 ∙ 𝜆𝑐 
Source: M. D. Haworth, et al., Significant pulse-lengthening in a multigigawatt magnetically insulated transmission line oscillator. 
 IEEE Transactions on Plasma Science, 26(3):312–319, Jun 1998. 
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Evaluation MILO (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology The MILO is a cross-field (runtime) vacuum electron tube. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 4 The design of a MILO requires academic training 
- Assembling KA = 3 
The construction and assembling of a MILO, knowledge at the 
level of a specialist (e.g. craftsman or technician) is required. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
Depending on the technology readiness level of the built-up MILO, 
only an instruction in handling is necessary for its operation. 
(general knowledge to basic understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 – 3 
The most of the required components are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 0 MILOs are currently not on sale. 
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Evaluation MILO (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility 
M = 3 - 4 
M = 4 - 5 
M = 5 
L-Band MILO 
S-Band MILO 
C-Band and X-Band MILO 
As a rule of thumb, the external radius of a MILO can be estimated 
over the relationship ra   0.6 l and the overall length Lges   6 l. 
As an estimate for the construction volume follows VRF   7 l
3  
Frequency Range L, S, C , X fRF = 1 - 12 GHz  
Max. Power Output Pmax  7 GW 
Efficiency h  15 % 
4.3.3.3 MILO 
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4.3.3.4 Klystron 
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4.3.3.4 Klystron 
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Klystron Amplifier (Applegate Diagram) 
Source: J. W. Gewartowski and H. A. Watson, Principles of Electron Tubes: Including Grid-Controlled Tubes,  
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Klystron Amplifier (Example) 
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Klystron Amplifier (Example) 
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4.3.3.4 Klystron 
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4.3.3.4 Klystron 
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Reltron Oscillator (Applegate Diagram) 
Source: R. B. Miller, et al., Super-reltron theory and experiments,  
 IEEE Trans. Plasma Sci., 20(3):332, June 1992. 
4.3.3.4 Klystron 
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Reltron Oscillator (SUPRA) 
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Reltron Oscillator (SUPRA) 
Source: Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and CBRN Protection (WIS). 
4.3.3.4 Klystron 
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Evaluation Klystron (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology The Klystron is a runtime vacuum electron tube (drift tube). 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 4 The design of a Klystron requires academic training 
- Assembling KA = 3 - 4 
For the construction of a klystron an academic education (e.g. 
bachelor) or knowledge at the level of an experienced technician 
is required 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
Depending on the technology readiness level of the built-up 
Klystron, only an instruction in handling is necessary for its 
operation. (general knowledge to basic understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2  
The components and modules  are available from specialist 
retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 3 
Klystrons up to the MW power range for broadcasting or industrial 
applications are offered in commercial retailers. 
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Evaluation Klystron (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility 
M= 4 
M = 5 
UHF-Band and L-Band Klystron 
S-Band, C-Band and X-Band Klystron 
As a rule of thumb, the external radius of a Klystron can be 
estimated over the relationship ra   0.5 l and the overall length  
Lges   3 l. 
Frequency Range UHF, L, S, C, X fRF = 0,3 - 12 GHz  
Max. Power Output 
Pmax  0,5 GW 
Pmax = 1 - 10 GW 
Conventional Klystron 
relativistic Klystron (Reltron) 
Efficiency 
h  70 % 
h  60 % 
h  75 % 
conventional low power klystron 
conventional high power klystron  
relativistic klystron/reltron 
4.3.3.4 Klystron 
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4.3.3.5 (Transmission) Line Resonator 
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4.3.3.5 Line Resonator 
Line Resonator (Operating Principle) 
1 2 3 
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4.3.3.5 Line Resonator 




HV Source Gunn Diode 
insulated metal slide  
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Evaluation Line Resonator  (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
Line resonators are transit time oscillators (delay lines) 
consisting of mismatched RF lines. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 2 – 3 
The design of a line resonator requires expertise at the level of a 
trained specialist. 
- Assembling KA = 2 - 3 
The construction and assembling of a line resonator requires 
expertise at the level of a trained specialist. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
For the operation of line resonators, only an instruction in handling 
is necessary. (general knowledge to basic understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2  
The most of the required components are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 1 - 2 
Line resonators (e.g. pot circuits) up to the kW power range for 
applications in broadcasting or amateur radio are offered in 
commercial trade. 
Costs Cexp  2 The cost for the acquisition of line resonator is approx. € 10,000. 
4.3.3.5 Line Resonator 
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Evaluation Line Resonator  (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility 
M = 3 - 4 
M = 5 
VHF-Band Line Resonator 
UHF and L-Band Line Resonator 
As a rule of thumb, the external radius of a Line Resonator can be 
estimated over the relationship ra   0.1 l and the overall length  
Lges   0.25 l. 
Frequency Range VHF, UHF, (L) fRF = 0,03 - 1 GHz  
Max. Power Output Pmax  0.5 MW 
Efficiency h  60 % 
4.3.3.5 Line Resonator 
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4.3.3.6 Switched Oscillator (SWO) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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4.3.3.5 SWO 
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4.3.3.5 SWO 
Switched Oscillator (Example) 
Source: F. Vega and Farhad Rachidi., A Switched Oscillator Geometry Inspired by a Curvilinear Space—Part I: DC Considerations. 
 IEEE Transactions on Plasma Science,2016 
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4.3.3.5 SWO 
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4.3.3.5 SWO 
Switched Oscillator (MATRIX System) 
Source: W. D. Prather, et al., Survey of worldwide high power wideband capabilities, IEEE Trans. EMC, 46(3): 335, Aug 2004 
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Evaluation Switched Oscillator (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
Switched Oscillators are transit time oscillators (delay lines) 
consisting of mismatched RF lines.. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 2 – 3 
The design of a switched oscillator requires expertise at the level 
of a trained specialist. 
- Assembling KA = 2 - 3 
The construction and assembling of a switched oscillator requires 
expertise at the level of a trained specialist. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
For the operation of switched oscillator, only an instruction in 
handling is necessary. (general knowledge to basic 
understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 
The most of the required components are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 4 
Switched oscillators are currently offered only to a limited extent 
in commercial retailers. 
Costs Cexp = 1 – 3 
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Evaluation Switched Oscillator (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility 
M = 3 - 4 
M = 5 
VHF-Band Switched Oscillator 
UHF and L-Band Switched Oscillator 
As a rule of thumb, the external radius of a Switched Oscillator  
can be estimated over the relationship ra   0.1 l and the overall 
length Lges   0.25 l. 
Frequency Range VHF, UHF, L fRF = 0,03 - 2 GHz  
Max. Power Output Pmax  1 GW 
Efficiency h  60 % 
4.3.3.5 SWO 
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4.3.3.7 Antenna Oscillator (AO) 
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4.3.3.7 Antenna Oscillator 
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4.3.3.7 Antenna Oscillator 
Antenna Oscillator  
(Disconnected-Spiral Conically Wound Antenna) 
Source: M. Armanious et al., An Electrically Small Conical Folded Dipole Antenna for Use as a Compact, Self-Resonant Mesoband High-Power  
 Microwave Source, IEEE Trans. Antennas Propag., 62(12):5964, Dec 2014  
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Evaluation Antenna Oscillator (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
Switched Oscillators are transit time oscillators (delay lines) 
consisting of mismatched RF lines.. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 1 – 3 
The design of a switched oscillator requires expertise at the level 
of a trained technician. 
- Assembling KA = 2 - 3 
The construction and assembling of a antenna oscillator requires 
expertise at the level of a trained specialist. 
- Operation KO = 1 - 2 
For the operation of antenna oscillator, only an instruction in 
handling is necessary. (general knowledge to basic 
understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 
The most of the required components are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 0 Antenna oscillators are currently not on sale. 
Costs Cexp = 1 – 3 
The cost for the acquisition of antenna oscillator is up to.  
€ 100,000. 
4.3.3.7 Antenna Oscillator 
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Evaluation Antenna Oscillator (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility 
M = 2 - 4 
M = 5 
VHF-Band Antenna Oscillator 
UHF-Band Antenna Oscillator 
As a rule of thumb, the external radius of a Antenna Oscillator can 
be estimated over the relationship ra   l/8 and the overall length 
Lges   l/2. 
Frequency Range VHF, UHF, fRF = 0,03 - 1 GHz  
Max. Power Output Pmax  10 MW 
Efficiency h  50 % 
4.3.3.7 Antenna Oscillator 
22.01.2021 
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4.3.3.8 Comparison RF-Modulator 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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4.3.3.8 Comparison 





conv. rel conv. rel. 
Frequency Range UHF, L, S, C UHF, L, S, C, X L, S, C, X UHF, L, S, C, X 
Power Output  1 GW  1 MW  1 GW  7 GW  0,5 GW  10 GW 
Efficiency  15 %  80 %  40 %  15 %  70 %  50 % 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design 4 4 4 4 4 4 
- Assembling 3 3 3 3 3-4 3-4 
- Operation 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 
Availability 
- Components 3 3 3 2-3 2 3 
- RF-Modulator 0 1-2 3-4 0 3 4 
Mobility 3-5 3-5 3-5 3-5 4-5 4-5 
Volume VRF  2.5 l
3  VRF 1.4 l
3  VRF  4.5 l
3  VRF  8.6 l
3  VRF  4 l
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4.3.3.8 Comparison 
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4.3.3.8 Comparison 
Generic Hypoband RF- Modulator 
Typ HO-k-1 HO-k-2 HO-b-1 HO-b-2 





Frequency Range UHF, L, S, C, X L, S, C, X UHF, L, S, C, X L, S, C, X 
Power Output  10 MW  0,5 GW  1 GW  10 GW 
Efficiency  80 %  70 %  30 %  40 % 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design 4 
- Assembling 3 
- Operation 1-2 
Availability 
- Components nicht anwendbar 2-3 
- RF - Modulator 1-2 3 nicht anwendbar 
Mobility 3-5 
Volume VRF  1.4 l
3  VRF  4 l
3  VRF  4.5 l
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4.3.3.8 Comparison 











Frequency Range VHF, UHF, (L) VHF, UHF, L VHF, UHF, L 
Power Output  0.5 MW  1 GW  10 MW 
Efficiency  60 %  60 %  50 % 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design 2 – 3 2 – 3 1 – 3 
- Assembling 2 – 3 2 – 3 2 – 3 
- Operation 1-2 1-2 1-2 
Availability 
- Components 2 2 2 
- RF-Modulator 1 - 2 4 0 
Mobility 3 - 5 3 - 5 3 - 5 
Volume VRF  0.01 l
3  VRF  0.01 l
3  VRF  0.03 l
3  
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4.3.3.8 Comparison 
Generic Meso- and Sub-Hyperband RF- Modulator 
Typ MB-k-1 Mb-b-1 Mb-b-2 
Example TLO AO SWO 
Frequency Range VHF, UHF, (L) VHF, UHF, L VHF, UHF, L 
Power Output  0.5 MW  10 MW  1 GW 
Efficiency  60 %  50 %  60 % 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design 2 – 3 1 – 3 2 – 3 
- Assembling 2 – 3 2 – 3 2 – 3 
- Operation 1-2 1-2 1-2 
Availability 
- Components 2 2 2 
- RF-Modulator 1 - 2 0 4 
Mobility 3 - 5 3 - 5 3 - 5 
Volume VRF  0.01 l
3  VRF  0.03 l
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4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
Principal Structure 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
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4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
Design Example 
𝑟𝑖𝑝 
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Evaluation Pulse Forming Circuits 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology Pulse Forming Circuits 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 2  
The design of pulse forming circuits requires expertise at the level 
of an experienced hobby electrician. 
- Assembling KA = 2  
The construction and assembling of pulse forming circuits 
capabilities at the level of an experienced hobby electrician. 
- Operation KO = 1 -2 
For the operation of an pulse forming circuits only an instruction in 
the handling is necessary. (general knowledge to basic 
understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 The required components are available from specialist retailers. 
- Pulsed Power Source AVS = 0 
Pulse forming circuits are currently not offered in the commercial 
trade. 
Costs Cexp = 1 The cost of building pulse forming circuits is up to €1,000. 
4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
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4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
UWB Systems (JOLT) 
Source: C. E. Baum et al., "JOLT: a highly directive, very intensive, impulse-like radiator,"  
              in Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 92, no. 7, pp. 1096-1109, July 2004, doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2004.829011.. 
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4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
UWB Systems (HIRA) 
Source: F. Sabath, D. Nitsch, M. Jung and T. H. G. G. Weise, "Design and setup of a short pulse simulator for susceptibility investigations,"  
              in IEEE Transactions on Plasma Science, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 1722-1727, Oct. 2002,.doi: 10.1109/TPS.2002.805331. 
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Evaluation UWB Systems (1) 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology 
Switched Oscillators are transit time oscillators (delay lines) 
consisting of mismatched RF lines.. 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 3 – 4 
The design of a UWB system requires academic training  
(e.g. engineer) or an experienced specialist.. 
- Assembling KA = 3 
The construction and assembling of an UWB system  requires 
expertise at the level of a experienced specialist. 
- Operation KO = 1 
For the operation of antenna oscillator, only an instruction in 
handling is necessary. (general knowledge) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 – 3 
The most of the required components are available from 
specialist retailers. 
- RF - Modulator AVS = 0 UWB systems are currently not on sale. 
Costs Cexp = 2 – 3 
The cost for the acquisition of UWB systems is in the range  
€ 1,000  -  € 100,000. 
4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
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Evaluation UWB Systems (2) 
Criterion Level Description 
Volume / Mobility M = 2 - 3 
The structural size is determined by the necessary electric 
strength . 
Frequency Range fRF = 0 - 5 GHz  
Max. Power Output Pmax  75 GW 
Efficiency h  50 % 
4.3.4 Pulse Forming Circuits 
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4.3.4 Antennas 
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4.3.4 Antennas 
Principal Structure 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
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4.3.4 Antennas 





Dipole antenna KD = 2 D0 = 1,5 
l/2 cone 
antenna 
KD = 2 D0 = 1,643 
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4.3.4 Antennas 
Directivity of Antennas 
Source: P. Kildal, E. Martini and S. Maci, "Degrees of Freedom and Maximum Directivity of Antennas: A bound on maximum directivity of nonsuperreactive antennas‖.,  
             in IEEE Antennas and Propagation Magazine, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 16-25, Aug. 2017, doi: 10.1109/MAP.2017.2706659. 
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Evaluation Antennas 
Criterion Level Description 
Technology Antennas 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design KD = 2 – 4 
- Assembling KA = 2  
The construction and assembling of an antenna s capabilities at 
the level of an experienced hobby electrician. 
- Operation KO = 1 -2 
For the operation of an antenna only an instruction in the handling 
is necessary. (general knowledge to basic understanding) 
Availability 
- Components AVC = 2 The required components are available from specialist retailers. 
- Pulsed Power Source AVS = 2 Various antennas are currently available from specialist retailers. 
Costs Cexp = 1 - 2 
The cost for the construction of an antenna is up to €1,000. 
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EMI Risk Management  
5. Modeling of Scenarios and Systems 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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9. Examples 
10.Summary 
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5.1 Modeling of Generic IEMI Sources 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Principal Structure and Integration 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
RF-Modulator 
Pulsed Power Source 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
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Generic Carrier Platform (M = 5) 





Inside dimensions Outside dimensions Examples 
L B H L B H 
M 10-3 m3 mm mm mm mm mm mm 
M5-1 5 2 110 250 75 125 265 80 
Index card box, coffee 
 tin, box 
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Generic Carrier Platform (M = 4) 





Inside dimensions Outside dimensions Examples 
L B H L B H 
M 10-3 m3 mm mm mm mm mm mm 
M4-1 4 25 415 190 315 460 205 350 
Pilot's suitcase,  
small transport box 
M4-2 4 45 500 200 450 520 220 470 
ATX midi tower,  
PC case, small case 
M4-3 4 90 550 550 300 600 600 330 
transport box, 
Large suitcase 
M4-4 4 195 780 480 520 830 530 550 transport box 
M4-1 M4-2 
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Generic Carrier Platform (M = 3) 





Inside dimensions Outside dimensions Examples 
L B H L B H 
M 10-3 m3 mm mm mm mm mm mm 
M3-1 3 320 1,150 750 370 1,200 800 400 
Large transport box, 
 
M3-2 3 650 1,150 750 770 1,200 800 800 
Large transport box, 
Car 
M3-3 3 1,000 1,150 750 1,170 1,200 800 1,200 
Large transport box, 
Van 
M3-4 3 2,000 2,040 1,040 1,000 Single axis trailer 
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1. Selection of the carrier platform 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
(1) Selection of a carrier platform 
(2) Record of the values for  
• the knowledge (KD,TP) required to integrate the IEMI 
source into the platform,  
• availability (AVS,TP) and  
• costs (Cexp,TP) 
      for the carrier platform 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
22.01.2021 
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2. Selection of the RF modulator (Hypoband) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Typ HO-k-1 HO-k-2 HO-b-1 HO-b-2 





Frequency Range UHF, L, S, C, X L, S, C, X UHF, L, S, C, X L, S, C, X 
Power Output  10 MW  0,5 GW  1 GW  10 GW 
Efficiency  80 %  70 %  30 %  40 % 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design 4 
- Assembling 3 
- Operation 1-2 
Availability 
- Components not applicable 2-3 
- RF - Modulator 1-2 3 not applicable 
Mobility 3-5 
Volume VRF  1.4 
3  VRF  4 
3  VRF  4.5 
3  VRF  4 
3  
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2. Selection of the RF modulator  
 (Meso- and Sub-Hyperband) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Typ MB-k-1 MB-b-1 MB-b-2 
Example TLO AO SWO 
Frequency Range VHF, UHF, (L) VHF, UHF, L VHF, UHF, L 
Power Output  0.5 MW  10 MW  1 GW 
Efficiency  60 %  50 %  60 % 
Needed Knowledge 
- Design 2 – 3 1 – 3 2 – 3 
- Assembling 2 – 3 2 – 3 2 – 3 
- Operation 1-2 1-2 1-2 
Availability 
- Components 2 2 2 
- RF-Modulator 1 - 2 0 4 
Mobility 3 - 5 3 - 5 3 - 5 
Volume VRF  0.01 
3  VRF  0.03 
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2. Selection of the RF modulator 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
(1) Selection of the RF modulator 
(2) Record of the values for  
• the required knowledge (KD,RF)  
• availability (AVS,RF) and  
• costs (Cexp,RF) 
      for the selected RF modulator 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
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3. Partition of the useful volume 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Dividing the useful volume of the carrier system (VTP )  
into sub-volumes for  
• the primary energy and high voltage source (VHV),  
• the pulse power source (VHV),  
• the RF modulator (VRF) and  
• the antenna system (VAnt) 
according to the associated strategy A to E. 
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Problem (1) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
When subdividing the useful volume of the carrier platform, 
we should have in mind: 
• The volume of the primary energy & high voltage source 
specifies the operating time of the system. 
• The volume of the pulse power source determines an 
upper barrier for the pulse output power. 
• The maximum pulse output power of the generic  
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Volume of Pulse Power Sources (at Pmax) 










PRF,out h PRF,in VIG 
GW % GW 10-3 m-3 
HO-k-1 0.01 80 0.013 0.95 
HO-k-2 0.5 70 0.714 95.36 
HO-b-1 1 30 3.333 551.21 
HO-b-2 10 40 25 5,469.82 
MB-k-2 0.0005 60 0.0008 0.04 
MB-b-1 0.01 50 0.02 1.62 
MB-b-2 1 60 1.67 250.30 
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Problem (2) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
When subdividing the useful volume of the carrier platform, 
we should have in mind: 
• The volume for the RF modulator specifies a lower limit for 
its operating frequency. 
• The directional factor of an antenna is proportional to the 
square of the ratio of the antenna characteristic dimension 
to the operating wavelength 
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Strategy A)  Mobility M > 3 and  
      RF-Modulator HO-k-2, HO-b-1 or HO-b-2 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
RF-Modulator (VRF) 
Pulsed Power Source (VIG) 
Primary Energy &  
High Voltage Source (VHV) 
Antenna System (VAnt) 
Carrier Platform (VTP) 
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Strategy B)  Mobility M > 3 and  
      RF-Modulator MB-b-2 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 




Antenna System (VAnt) 
RF-Modulator (VRF) 
MB-B-2 (SWO) 
Pulsed Power Source (VIG) 
Primary Energy &  
High Voltage Source (VHV) 




Carrier Platform (VTP) 
22.01.2021 
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Strategy C.a)  RF-Modulator MB-b-1 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
𝑉𝐻𝑉 = 𝑉𝐼𝐺 ≤
𝑉𝑇𝑃
8




RF-Modulator MB-b-1 (VRF) 
& Antenna (VAnt) 
Pulsed Power Source (VIG) 
 
Primary Energy &  
High Voltage Source (VHV) 
Carrier Platform (VTP) 
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Strategy C.b)  RF-Modulator MB-b-1 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
𝑉𝐻𝑉 = 𝑉𝐼𝐺 ≤
𝑉𝑇𝑃
4




RF-Modulator MB-b-1 (VRF) 
& Antenna (VAnt) 
Pulsed Power Source (VIG) Primary Energy &  
High Voltage Source (VHV) 
Carrier Platform (VTP) 
22.01.2021 
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5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Strategy D)  Mobility M > 3 and  
      RF-Modulator HO-k-1 or MB-k-1 
HO-k-1: 
• VHV = VIG = 0,95  10
-3 m3  
• PRF,out = 0,01 GW 
• PRF,in = 0,013 GW 
• VRF = VAnt = (VTP – VHV – VIG)/2 
MB-k-1: 
• VHV = VIG = 0,04  10
-3 m3  
• PRF,out = 0,5 MW 
• PRF,in = 0,8 MW 
• VRF = VAnt = (VTP – VHV – VIG)/2 
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5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Strategy E)  Mobility M  3 
• The carrier system provides more volume as required 
– VRF is deduced from operation frequency 
– VHV and VIG are deduced from maximum output RF power 
– VAnt  VTP - VHV - VIG - VRF  
• Limit:  
– VAnt = VHV = VIG = VRF = VTP / 4 
22.01.2021 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high 
voltage source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
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4. Parameterization of primary energy and  
    high voltage source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Record of the values for  
• the required knowledge (KD,HV),  
• availability (AVS,HV) and  
• costs (Cexp,HV) 
for the primary energy and high voltage source 
22.01.2021 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
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5. Parameterization pulse power source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
(1) Record of the values for  
• the required knowledge (KD,IG),  
• availability (AVS,IG) and  
• costs (Cexp,IG) 
      for the primary energy and high voltage source 
(2) Estimation of the maximal output power (Pout) 
22.01.2021 
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4.3 EMI Sources 
Power Volume Ratio of Pulse Power Sources 
Source: E. Schamiloglu, R. J. Barker, M. Gundersen, and A. A. Neuber. Modern pulsed power: Charlie Martin and beyond.  
             In Proceedings of the IEEE, 92(7):1014–1020, July 2004, doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2004.829058 
Page 30 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
22.01.2021 
16 
Page 31 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Estimation of working frequency from the available volume 
VRF using the estimation formulas for the construction 
volume of the RF modulator. 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
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7. Parameterization antenna 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
(1) Record of the values for  
• the required knowledge (KD,Ant),  
• availability (AVS,Ant) and  
• costs (Cexp,Ant) 
      for the antenna system 
(2) Estimation of the directivity 
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Dipole antenna KD = 2 D0 = 1,5 
/2 cone 
antenna 
KD = 2 D0 = 1,643 




















5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
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Directivity of Antennas 
Source: P. Kildal, E. Martini and S. Maci, "Degrees of Freedom and Maximum Directivity of Antennas: A bound on maximum directivity of nonsuperreactive antennas”.,  
             in IEEE Antennas and Propagation Magazine, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 16-25, Aug. 2017, doi: 10.1109/MAP.2017.2706659. 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
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8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Estimation of the radiated pulse RF power based on the 
output power of the pulse power source and the efficiency 
of the RF modulator via the relationship 
𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∙ 𝜂 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
1. Selection of the carrier platform 
2. Selection of the RF modulator 
3. Partition of the useful volume 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage 
source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
6. Estimation of  operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
9. Estimation of normed emitted electric field strength 
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9. Estimation of emitted electric field strength 
 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
The normalized maximum energy flow density emitted (in 
the main beam direction) is given by: 





𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ 𝑟 = 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙  𝑟
2 ∙ 𝑍0 
=
𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑑 ∙ 𝐷0 ∙ 𝑍0
4𝜋
 
In the far field, the maximum electric field strength emitted 
by the generic IEMI source can be estimated via: 
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Modeling Generic IEMI Sources 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Intermediate Result: 
During the first 9 modeling steps we 
 Assumed  
 the mobility of the IEMI Source (carrier platform) 
 the usage of a selected generic RF modulator 
 Recorded  
 required knowledge and cost for the acquisition or  
 assembly of each module 
 availability of technology and/or modules  
 Estimated  
 the operating frequency 
 the emitted maximum field strength  
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Modeling Generic IEMI Sources 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Remaining Open Question: 
 Probability that the attacker has access to  
 the modules.  
 the considered generic IEMI Source. 
 
Approach: 
 Evaluation of  
 required knowledge 
 availability 
 costs 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source (2) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
10.Evaluation of required knowledge 
11.Evaluation of required financial resources/costs 
12.Evaluation of  availability of technology/modules 
13.Estimation probability of occurrence of the modules 
14.Estimation Probability of occurrence (PCU) of the 
complete IEMI source 
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10. Evaluation of Required Knowledge 






Carrier Platform KD,TP PK,TP 
Primary Energy & 





RF-Modulator KD,RF PK,RF 
Antenna System KD,Ant PK,Ant 
? 
Probability that the potential attacker has access to the knowledge 
required to construction and operation the given module. 
Page 44 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
4.2 Generic Offender 
Generic Offender: Knowledge 
Knowledge Level Index of Probability  
general knowledge Novice 1 9  
frequent 
(90 - 97%) 
basic understanding  Skilled 2 7 
probable 
(50 – 75%) 
specialized knowledge  
and expertise 
Specialist 3 6 
occasional 
(25 – 50%) 
academic knowledge  
and professional expertise 
Graduate 4 4 
occasional 
(5 – 12%) 
expert knowledge  
and profound expertise 
Expert 5 3 
remote 
(2 – 5%) 
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10. Evaluation of Required Knowledge 






Carrier Platform KD,TP PK,TP 
Primary Energy & 





RF-Modulator KD,RF PK,RF 
Antenna System KD,Ant PK,Ant 
Generic  
Offender 
Probability that the generic offender has access to the knowledge 
required to construction and operation the given module. 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source (2) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
10.Evaluation of required knowledge 
11.Evaluation of required financial resources/costs 
12.Evaluation of  availability of technology/modules 
13.Estimation probability of occurrence of the modules 
14.Estimation Probability of occurrence (PCU) of the 
complete IEMI source 
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10. Evaluation of Required Costs 






Carrier Platform Cexp,TP PC,TP 
Primary Energy & 





RF-Modulator Cexp,RF PC,RF 
Antenna System Cexp,Ant PC,Ant 
Generic  
Offender 
Probability that the generic offender has access to the access to  
funds  required to construction and operation the given module. 
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4.2 Generic Offender 
Generic Offender: Financial Recourses 
Available financial recourses Index of Probability  
< 1.000 € Low 1 9  
Frequent 
(90 - 97%) 
1.000 – 10.000 € Moderate 2 6 
occasional 
(25 – 50%) 
10.000 – 100.000 € Increased 3 4 
occasional 
(5 – 12%) 
100.000 – 1.000.000 € High 4 2 
remote 
(1 – 2%) 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source (2) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
10.Evaluation of required knowledge 
11.Evaluation of required financial resources/costs 
12.Evaluation of  availability of technology/modules 
13.Estimation probability of occurrence of the modules 
14.Estimation Probability of occurrence (PCU) of the 
complete IEMI source 
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12. Evaluation of Availability 






Carrier Platform AVS,TP PA,TP 
Primary Energy & 





RF-Modulator AVC,RF PA,RF 
Antenna System AVC,Ant PA,Ant 
Generic  
Offender 
Probability that the generic offender has access to technology and 
components required to construction and operation the given module. 
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4.2 Generic Offender 
Generic Offender: Availability 
Availability Level Index of Probability  
of-the-shelf 1 8 
probable 
(75 – 90 %) 
commercially available 2 6 
occasional 
(25 – 50 %) 
specialized trade 3 4 
occasional 
(5 – 12 %) 
limited acquisition 4 2 
remote 
(2 – 5 %) 
restricted acquisition 5 1 
unlikely 
(0,5 – 1 %) 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source (2) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
10.Evaluation of required knowledge 
11.Evaluation of required financial resources/costs 
12.Evaluation of  availability of technology/modules 
13.Estimation probability of occurrence of the 
modules 
14.Estimation Probability of occurrence (PCU) of the 
complete IEMI source 
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13. Probability of Occurrence of the Modules 
 














Carrier Platform PK,TP PA,TP PC,TP PTP  = ? 
Primary Energy & 
High Voltage Source 
PK,HV PA,HV PC,HV PHV  = ? 
Pulsed Power 
Source 
PK,IG PA,IG PC,IG PIG  = ? 
RF-Modulator PK,RF PA,RF PC,RF PRF  = ? 
Antenna System PK,Ant PA,Ant PC,Ant PAnt   = ? 
Probability that the generic offender has access to a modules  
or is capable to construct, assemble and operation them. 
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13. Probability of Occurrence of the Modules 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Assumption: 
Knowledge, Availability, and Cost are independent 
aspects 
• If the probability would satisfies the Kolmogorow Axioms 
 PTP = PK,TP  PA,TP  PC,TP  
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13. Probability of Occurrence of the Modules 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
Assumption: 
Knowledge, Availability, and Cost are independent 
aspects 
 The Probability Index does not satisfy the Kolmogorow  
    Axioms 
 The offender has access to the module if all three  
   aspects are fulfilled. 
  PTP = min{PK,TP  PA,TP  PC,TP} 
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13. Probability of Occurrence of the Modules 
 














Carrier Platform PK,TP PA,TP PC,TP 
PC,TP  
= min{PK,TP, PA,TP, PC,TP} 
Primary Energy & 
High Voltage Source 
PK,HV PA,HV PC,HV 
PC,HV  
= min{PK,HV, PA,HV, PC,HV} 
Pulsed Power 
Source 
PK,IG PA,IG PC,IG 
PC,IG  
= min{PK,IG, PA,IG, PC,IG} 
RF-Modulator PK,RF PA,RF PC,RF 
PC,RF  
= min{PK,RF, PA,RF, PC,RF} 
Antenna System PK,Ant PA,Ant PC,Ant 
PC,Ant  
= min{PK,Ant, PA,Ant, PC,Ant} 
Probability that the generic offender has access to a modules  
or is capable to construct, assemble and operation them. 
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Modeling of a Generic IEMI Source (2) 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
10.Evaluation of required knowledge 
11.Evaluation of required financial resources/costs 
12.Evaluation of  availability of technology/modules 
13.Estimation probability of occurrence of the modules 
14.Estimation Probability of occurrence (PCU) of the 
complete IEMI source 
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14. Occurrence of complete IEMI Source 
 














Carrier Platform PK,TP PA,TP PC,TP 
PC,TP  
= min{PK,TP, PA,TP, PC,TP} 
Primary Energy & 
High Voltage Source 
PK,HV PA,HV PC,HV 
PC,HV  
= min{PK,HV, PA,HV, PC,HV} 
Pulsed Power 
Source 
PK,IG PA,IG PC,IG 
PC,IG  
= min{PK,IG, PA,IG, PC,IG} 
RF-Modulator PK,RF PA,RF PC,RF 
PC,RF  
= min{PK,RF, PA,RF, PC,RF} 
Antenna System PK,Ant PA,Ant PC,Ant 
PC,Ant  
= min{PK,Ant, PA,Ant, PC,Ant} 
Complete  
IEMI Source 
Probability that the generic offender has 
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14. Occurrence of complete IEMI Source 
 














Carrier Platform PK,TP PA,TP PC,TP 
PC,TP  
= min{PK,TP, PA,TP, PC,TP} 
Primary Energy & 
High Voltage Source 
PK,HV PA,HV PC,HV 
PC,HV  
= min{PK,HV, PA,HV, PC,HV} 
Pulsed Power 
Source 
PK,IG PA,IG PC,IG 
PC,IG  
= min{PK,IG, PA,IG, PC,IG} 
RF-Modulator PK,RF PA,RF PC,RF 
PC,RF  
= min{PK,RF, PA,RF, PC,RF} 
Antenna System PK,Ant PA,Ant PC,Ant 
PC,Ant  
= min{PK,Ant, PA,Ant, PC,Ant} 
Complete  
IEMI Source 
Probability that the generic offender has 
access to  the complete IEMI source 
PCU  
= min{PC,TP, PC,HV, PC,IG, PC,RF, PC,Ant} 
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Data Sheet 
5.1 Generic IEMI Sources 
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Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
www.geml.uni-hannover.de 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2  
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Carrier Platform 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
1. Carrier Platform: M4-2  VTP = 41  10
-3 m3  
2. RF-Modulator: MB-b-2 (SWO) 
3. Partition of the useful volume: Strategy B 
• VHV = VIG = VTP/3 = 13,67  10
-3 m3  
• VRF = VAnt = VTP/6 = 8,83  10
-3 m3  
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Modules 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
4. Parameterization of primary energy and high voltage source 
5. Parameterization pulse power source 
𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝐼𝐺 ≤ 4 ∙ 13,67 ∙ 10
−3 0,878∙  100,878𝐺𝑊 = 519 𝑀𝑊 
6. Estimation of operating frequency 
7. Parameterization antenna 
/4 Cone Antenna   D0 = 1,643 






= 340 𝑀𝐻𝑧 
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Emitted electric field strength 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
8. Evaluation impulse output RF power 
𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝐼𝐺 ∙ 𝜂 = 519 𝑀𝑊 ∙ 0,6 = 311 𝑀𝑊 








 = 41 MW 
𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ 𝑟 = 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ 𝑟
2 ∙ 377Ω = 124 kV 
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HPMcase Standard F 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
DR = 3,37  Emax r = 227 kV 
Page 66 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Probability of Occurrence of RF Modulator 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
RF-Modulator: MB-b-2 (SWO) 
Knowledge KD,RF = 2 – 3   PK,RF = 6 – occasional 
Availability AVC,RF = 2   PA,RF = 6 – occasional 
Financial Recourses Cexp,RF = 2   PC,RF = 6 – occasional 
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Probability of Occurrence of RF Modulator 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
RF-Modulator: MB-b-2 (SWO) 
Knowledge KD,RF = 2 – 3   PK,RF = 6 – occasional 
Availability AVC,RF = 2   PA,RF = 6 – occasional 
Financial Recourses Cexp,RF = 2   PC,RF = 6 – occasional 
PRF = min{PK,RF, PA,RF, PC,RF} =  6 - occasional 
generic 
offener 
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Probability of Occurrence of Modules 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
RF-Modulator:  
MB-b-2 (SWO) 
PRF =  6 - occasional 
Antenna:  
Cone Antenna 
PAnt =  7 - probable 
Pulsed Power Source:  
Marx-Generator 
PIG =  5 - occasional 
Primary Energy Source:  
24V-Akku + DC/DC 
PHV =  5 - occasional 
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Probability of Occurrence of Modules 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
RF-Modulator:  
MB-b-2 (SWO) 
PRF =  6 - occasional 
Antenna:  
Cone Antenna 
PAnt =  7 - probable 
Pulsed Power Source:  
Marx-Generator 
PIG =  5 - occasional 
Primary Energy Source:  
24V-Akku + DC/DC 
PHV =  5 - occasional 
Carrier System:  
Industriekoffer 
PTP =  8 - probable 
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Probability of Occurrence of IEMI Source 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
5.2 Example: M4-2:MB-b-2 
RF-Modulator:  
MB-b-2 (SWO) 
PRF =  6 - occasional 
Antenna:  
Cone Antenna 
PAnt =  7 - probable 
Pulsed Power Source:  
Marx-Generator 
PIG =  5 - occasional 
Primary Energy Source:  
24V-Akku + DC/DC 
PHV =  5 - occasional 
Carrier System:  
Industriekoffer 
PTP =  8 - probable 
EMI Source 
M4-2:MB-b-2 
PCU =  5 - occasional 
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5.3 Modeling of Generic IEMI Scenario 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Heinrich Hertz Street 




















































with an IEMI Source 
Type M4-2:MB-b-2 
on parking lot P2 
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Probability of Occurrence of IEMI Scenario 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
Potential Offender 
Access to  
the vicinity of the target system 
Access to  
the IEMI Source 
IEMI Source can be  
moved to the selected 
location in vicinity of target system 
Protection Concept 
PA 
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outside inside Definition 
1o free X 
Area of the general public (outdoors) accessible to each 
person without special effort. 
1i free X 
Area of the general public (indoors) accessible to each person 
without special effort. 
2o monitored  X Area of the general public whose access is or can be monitored. 
2i monitored X Area in a building whose access is or can be monitored. 
3o controlled X Outdoor area that can only be entered after an identity check 
3i controlled X 
Area in a building that can only be entered after an identity 
check 
4o restricted X 
Outdoor control / restricted area that can only be accessed by 
authorized persons or after a pocket check. 
4i restricted X 
Control / restricted area in the building, which can only be 
entered by authorized persons or after a pocket check. 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
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Generic Offender: Access (example) 
AZ Accessibility Index of Probability  
(internal offender) 














monitored  9 
frequent 
(90 - 97%) 
8 
probable 





(50 – 75%) 
6 
occasional 





(12 – 25%) 
3 
remote 
(2 – 5%) 
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Probability of Occurrence of IEMI Scenario 
Potential Offender 
Access to  
the vicinity of the target system 
Access to  
the IEMI Source 
IEMI Source can be  
moved to the selected 
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Probability of Occurrence of IEMI Source 
Antenna EM Feld 
Primary Energy  
Source 
Energy Storage  
Antenna 
Matching 




Pulsed Power Source Antenna System 
RF-Modulator:  
MB-b-2 (SWO) 
PRF =  6 - occasional 
Antenna:  
Cone Antenna 
PAnt =  7 - probable 
Pulsed Power Source:  
Marx-Generator 
PIG =  5 - occasional 
Primary Energy Source:  
24V-Akku + DC/DC 
PHV =  5 - occasional 
Carrier System:  
Industriekoffer 
PTP =  8 - probable 
EMI Source 
M4-2:MB-b-2 
PCU =  5 - occasional 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
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Probability of Occurrence of IEMI Scenario 
Potential Offender 
Access to  
the vicinity of the target system 
Access to  
the IEMI Source 
IEMI Source can be  
moved to the selected 
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Heinrich Hertz Street 






































Me lowest necessary mobility 
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Generic Infrastructure – Mobility, Scale 
Level 
(M) 
Mobility Volume Example 
1 stationary > 77m3 
Fixed 
installation 
2 transportable 10 - 77m3 
light truck –  
40‘ Container 
3 mobil 0,2 – 10 m3 car / van 
4 very mobil 0,02 – 0,2 m3 briefcase 
5 highly mobile < 0,02 m3 beverage can 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
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Likelihood that IEMI Source can be moved to Location 
Plo 
Az = 1o (general public) Az = 1i (general public) 
MTP MTP 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Me 
2 5 8 9 10 10 6 8 9 10 10 
3 3 5 8 9 10 4 6 8 9 10 
4 1 3 5 8 9 2 4 6 8 10 
5 0 1 3 5 8 1 2 4 6 8 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
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Plo 
Az = 2o (monitored) 
Az = 3o (controlled) 
Az = 2i (monitored) 
Az = 3o (controlled) 
MTP MTP 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Mt 
2 5 8 9 10 10 6 8 9 10 10 
3 3 5 8 9 10 4 6 8 9 10 
4 1 3 5 8 9 2 4 6 8 10 
5 0 1 3 5 8 1 2 4 6 8 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
Likelihood that IEMI Source can be moved to Location 
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Plo 
Az = 4o (restricted) Az = 4i (restricted) 
MTP MTP 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Mt 
2 3 7 7 9 10 4 7 8 9 10 
3 2 4 7 8 9 3 5 7 8 9 
4 0 2 4 7 8 1 3 5 7 8 
5 0 1 2 4 7 0-1 1 3 5 7 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
Likelihood that IEMI Source can be moved to Location 
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Probability of Occurrence of IEMI Scenario 
PEMI 
Potential Offender 
Access to  
the vicinity of the target system 
Access to  
the IEMI Source 
IEMI Source can be  
moved to the selected 
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Summary IEMI Szenario 
• EMI scenarios include technical and non-technical  
(e.g. human) aspects 
• Assessment of the environment of the target system  
in terms of accessibility and mobility 
• Generic IEMI Source Types 
• Estimation of the probability of an EMI scenario occurring 
• Comparison with properties of the generic attacker 
• Comparison mobility 
5.3 Generic IEMI Scenarios 
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5.4 Scenario Interaction Model  
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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TSECA - Process 
Evaluate each failure mode and  
assign a severity classification category 
Identify failure  
detection methods 
Identify corrective measures  
for failure modes 
Documentation 
Define the  
 EMI threat scenario 
Construct scenario interaction model  
and system structure model 
Determine effects  
and failure modes 
Source:  F. Sabath and H. Garbe, "Concept of stochastic modeling for High-Power Electromagnetics (HPEM) risk analysis at system level,"  
 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Denver, CO, 2013, pp. 401-406, doi: 10.1109/ISEMC.2013.6670446 
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Interaction  Model – Interaction Sequence Diagram 
Scenario interaction model 
(propagation of IEMI environment) 
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EM Coupling: Numerical Modeling  
Maxwell 
Equations 
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EM Wave Propagation: Approximation  
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Topologic Concept 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Topologic Concept - Approach 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Topologic Concept – Network Representation 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Transfer Functions 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  D.V. Giri; Richard Hoad; Frank Sabath, High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems ,  
 Chapter 3 HPEM Coupling and Interaction, Artech, 2020. 
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Topologic Concept: Example 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Topologic Concept: Example 












Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Topologic Concept: Example 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Topologic Concept: Example 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Topologic Concept: Example 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Topologic Concept: Example 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
(high frequency) 
Source:  J.-P. Parmantier and I. Junqua I. (2007) EM Topology: From Theory to Application. In: Sabath F., Mokole E.L., Schenk U., Nitsch D. (eds) 
 Ultra-Wideband, Short-Pulse Electromagnetics 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-37731-5_1. 
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Modeling of Buildings (Difusive Penetration) 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
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Modeling of Buildings (Difusive Penetration) 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  Frenzel, T., J. Rohde und J. Opfer: Elektromagnetische Schirmung von Gebäuden – Praktische Messungen, Band BSI-TR-03209-2. 
 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2008. 
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Modeling of Buildings (Difusive Penetration) 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  Frenzel, T., J. Rohde und J. Opfer: Elektromagnetische Schirmung von Gebäuden – Praktische Messungen, Band BSI-TR-03209-2. 
 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2008. 
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Numeric analysis of external coupling 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  R. Rambousky, A. Bausen, S. Lange and F. Sabath, "IEMI-testing of electronic systems in critical infrastructure surrounding,"  
 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), Dresden, 2015, pp. 1057-1062. doi: 10.1109/ISEMC.2015.7256314. 
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Numeric analysis of external coupling 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Source:  R. Rambousky, A. Bausen, S. Lange and F. Sabath, "IEMI-testing of electronic systems in critical infrastructure surrounding,"  
 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), Dresden, 2015, pp. 1057-1062. doi: 10.1109/ISEMC.2015.7256314. 
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Impact of system casing 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
Average Value 
Frequency Range 
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0 - 10 dB 
Very low shielding  
No shielding against disturbances 
10 – 30 dB 
Low shielding  
Slight disturbances can be eliminated 
30 – 60 dB 
Average shielding in the RF range  
High shield damping against magnetic fields in the LF 
range 
60 – 90 dB 
Very good shielding for medium to large EMC problems 
90 – 150 dB 
Generally the maximum, possible with extremely good 
shielding designs 
150 dB 
Detection threshold of current technology 
5.4 Scenario Interaction 
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EMI Risk Management  
6. Effects and Error States 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Content 
1. Introduction & Basic Terms 
2. Fundamentals of Risk Management 
3. Risk Analysis Methods 
4. EMI Scenario 
5. Modeling of scenarios and systems 
6. Effects and Error States 
7. Risk Evaluation 
8. Risk Treatment and Protection 
9. Examples 
10.Summary 
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6.1 Introduction 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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Effects and Error States 
6.1 Introduction 
Note the   
effects and consequences 
you observe  
on the following slides 
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Source: M. Camp. Empfindlichkeit elektronischer Schaltungen gegen transiente elektromagnetische Feldimpuls. Shaker Verlag, Aachen, 2004. 
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6.1 Introduction 
ICT Network Effects 



















































Server Lan 1 Server Lan 2 FTP Traffic Shot Source: WIS 
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6.1 Introduction 
System level Consequences 
Source: BBC 
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Effects and Error States 
6.2 Effects and Error States 
Which   
effects and consequences 
did you observe?  
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Effects and Error States 
• Flickering screens/distorted display 
• Black screen 
• Displaying incorrect data 
• Responding to sensors 
• Decrease in computing power/throughput 
• Hang/crash programs 
• Falsification of data 
• Reboot/Reboot Computers & Controllers 
• Failure/destruction 
6.2 Effects and Error States 
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Effects and Error States 
How can these effects be compared? 
 Categorization 
 by Mechanism 
 How is the effect caused? 
 Where does the effect occur? 
 by Duration 
 How long (compared to exposure) can the 
effects be observed? 
 by Criticality 
 What does the effect mean for the function of 
the system? 
6.2 Effects and Error States 
22.01.2021 
8 
Page 15 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
www.geml.uni-hannover.de 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
 
Page 16 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 





• Shift of operation point 
• False information 
• Transient upset 




















• Latch-Up; Punch-through 
• Flashover 
• Wire melting and debonding 
• Thermal destruction 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Noise 
EM environments can add additional noise to a signal line 
or a receiver.  
• the receiver might be able to correctly detect bits so that 
bit errors can be restored.  
• additional noise reduces the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)  
• might therefore decrease the usable data rate.  
• Analog circuits are more sensitive to signal noise.  
• An induced noise signal on signal or power lines of analog 
circuits might cause noisy displays or flashing of displays. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Rectification 
Rectification at a non-linear component  
• converts an alternating current (AC) into a direct current (DC).  
• can also lead to the creation of intermodulation or harmonics. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 149 
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Interference/Jamming 
• Interference or jamming occurs if the interfered signal 
causes a noise background that masks the wanted 
signal by some, usually small, margin.  
• A jamming or interference signal only needs to be a few 
dB more than the wanted signal and the wanted signal 
may be very small 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Saturation 
• Saturation implies that the receiver components (LNA) 
goes into compression and results in non-linearity and 
hence desensitises the receiver and may cause 
production of spurious modulation and intermodulation 
products.  
• The saturation effect may persist for a short time after the 
interfering signal is removed.  
• This type of effect mechanism can also occur in back-door 
coupling particularly in analogue circuit components with 
feedback such as Op-amps. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Shift of operation point 
• The behavior of digital and most analogue electronic 
circuits and components are characterized by non-linear 
junctions.  
• Interference in the power distribution system of electronic 
components and circuits are capable of causing a change 
of the potential at the electronic component and 
respectively into a shift of the operating point of the 
component.  
• A shift of the operating point of a digital-to-analogue 
converter results in wrong data. Other effects are 
compression of analogue data and DC-offset of data. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Shift of operation point 
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False information 
• interference signal may feed false information to the data 
stream or alternate information bits of the data stream.  
• The intentional creation of such a situation is known as 
spoofing. 
• Consequences can be critical, as the exposed system 
operates on corrupted or false information.  
• During HPEM tests the corruption of data streams resulted 
in a malfunction of the system or component up to a hang-
up or crashing of software and break down of the system 
under test. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Transient upset 
The input interference voltages cause logic input gates 
 
•  to detect a supposed signal change or 
•  not to detect a signal change. 
1   0   0  1   0   0  1   0   0  1   0   0  1 
1   0   0  0   0   0  1   1   1  1   0   0  1 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Transient upset 
(i) Base state 
(ii) Bit flip/ Change  
     state/  Delay 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 153 
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Transient upset 
(iii) False bit 
(vi) Bit drift 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 153 
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Transient upset 
(v) Ground Shift 
(vi) Voltage suppression 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 153 
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Chaotic behavior 
• It has been shown that circuits which incorporate 
feedback to regulate their linear behavior such as Phase 
Locked Loops (PLLs) can be nudged into a chaotic or 
random state through HPEM exposure.  
• Nonlinear systems such as PLLs can exhibit a wide 
variety of complex behavior including subharmonic, 
quasiperiodic and chaotic dynamics.  
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Latch-Up 
The term latch-up refers to a malfunction at the inputs of a 
CMOS stage, triggered by a short voltage peak. 
 
The latch-up effect is caused by parasitic thyristors which 
necessarily result from the layer structure of the individual 
dopings of n-channel and p-channel FETs in a common 
substrate (bulk) in the semiconductor module. Ignition of these 
parasitic thyristors results in a direct short circuit of the supply 
voltage on the CMOS component, which almost always leads to 
destruction of the component due to thermal overload. Modern 
CMOS circuits have special geometric arrangements of the 
doping regions of the n and p FETs for suppressing this 
interference effect at the inputs. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Latch-Up 
Thyristor 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Punch-through 
Punch-through in a MOSFET is an extreme case of channel 
length modulation where the depletion layers around the drain 
and source regions merge into a single depletion region.  
The field underneath the gate then becomes strongly dependent 
on the drain-source voltage, as is the drain current.  
Punch through causes a rapidly increasing current with 
increasing drain-source voltage. This effect is undesirable as it 
increases the output conductance and limits the maximum 
operating voltage of the device. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Flashover 
• High potential differences lead to 
flashover between conductive parts 
such as  
GND and VCC layers/elements 
Signal roads 
 
• The high current flowing  
during the flashover often  
leads to thermal destruction  
of components 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Wire melting and debonding 
High currents on signal lines (on 
chip) as well as on bonding lines 
can lead to thermal melting of 
signal lines. 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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region steady state region 
Wunsch-Bell 
region 
Pt – power required to destroy the component 
A - area of the heated region 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
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Thermal destruction 
6.3 Effects Mechanisms 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 190 
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6.4 Published circuit and  
component level effects data 
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CMOS: 100%-Destruction (U_primär) by Impulse of positive polarity
Impuls width: 3 ns (green), 6 ns (blue), 12 ns (red), 80 ns (black)


















6.4 Published Data 
Source: ABB 
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TTL: : 100%-Destruction (U_primär) by Impulse of positive polarity
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Voltage of destruction U_prim vs. Impulsparameter "Width (ns)" und "Number of Impulsel (n)"





    Average DIL    (CMOS) 
    Average SMD  (CMOS)     
    Average DIL    (TTL) 
    Average SMD  (TTL) 
6.4 Published Data 
Source: ABB 
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Published circuit and component level effects data 
NAND gate  
6.4 Published Data 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 157 
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Published circuit and component level effects data 
Microprocessor 
6.4 Published Data 
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Published circuit and component level effects data 
Microprocessor 
6.4 Published Data 
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Published circuit and component level effects data 
Microprocessor 
6.4 Published Data 
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6.5 System and Network Level Effects 
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System and Network Level Effects 
• Loss of data 
• Reset (where the computer re-started automatically) 
• Network Upset 
• Disk Write error (reported by the operating system) 
• Loss of hard disk access (reported by the operating 
system, power down required) 




















• Damaged components 
6.5 System and Network Level Effects 
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DPc (NB 1) DPc (NB 2) Hub (NB 1) FTP Traffic (NB1) Shot 
HPM Exposure Dip in data transmission 
6.5 System and Network Level Effects 
Source: WIS 
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D-Pc NB 2 Hub FTP Traffic Shot 
HPM Exposure Interferences in  
data transmission 
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Server Lan 1 Server Lan 2 FTP Traffic Shot 
HPM Exposure Discontinuities in  
data transmission 
6.5 System and Network Level Effects 
Source: WIS 
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NB 2 Hub D-Pc FTP Traffic Shot 
HPM Exposure Dropout of  
data transmission 
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6.6 Classification of Effects 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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6.6 Classification of Effects 
Classification by Mechanism (I) 
Category Effekt Description 
U unknown 
Unable to determine due to effects on another component or not 
observed. 










Raised noise level on system signal and power lines, which 
results in flashing of displays or reduced data rates. 
I.2 bit flip HPEM exposure causes corruption of bits in a data stream. 
I.3 failure Malfunction of the system / component due HPEM exposure. 
I.4 break down Hang-up or crashing of software. 
Source: F. Sabath; Classification of Electromagnetic Effects at System Level”, Ultra-Wideband, Short Pulse Electromagnetics 9,  
 Springer Science + Business Media, pp. 325- 334, 2010, ISBN 978-0-387-77844-0 
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Classification by Mechanism (II) 









D.1 latch up HPEM exposure causes latch up in semiconductor components. 
D.2 flashover On chip flashover / flashover in components. 
D.3 
on chip wire 
melting 






Wires on PCB and/or bond wires in semiconductor devices are 
melted by coupling of HPEM energy. 
6.6 Classification of Effects 
Source: F. Sabath; Classification of Electromagnetic Effects at System Level”, Ultra-Wideband, Short Pulse Electromagnetics 9,  
 Springer Science + Business Media, pp. 325- 334, 2010, ISBN 978-0-387-77844-0 
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Classification by Duration 
Level Duration Description 
U unknown 
No effect occurs or the duration of an effect has not been observed. (e.g. 
observer was unable to determine the duration due to effects on another 
component).  
N no effect No effect occurs.  
E during exposure only 
Observed effect is present only during exposure to HPEM environment; system 
functionallity is completely available after HPEM exposure is over . 
T 
some (follow-up) time 
after exposure 
Effect is present some time after HPEM exposure is over, but the system 
recovers without human intervention. 
Follow-up time is shorter or equal to typical reaction/operation cycle of the 
system. 
H 
resistant until human 
intervention 
Effect is present untill human intervention (e.g. reset, restart of function). Due to 
the effect the system is not able to recover to normal operation within an 
acceptable period (e.g. typical reaction/operation cycle of the system).  
No replacement of hardware or reload of software is necessary.  
P 
permanent or until 
replacement of HW / 
SW 
Effect is permanent; usual interactions of an operator or user does not recover 
normal operation. 
Effect has damaged hardware to the point that is must be replaced or software 
to the point that it must be reloaded. 
6.6 Classification of Effects 
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Example: T-Effekt 



















































Server Lan 1 Server Lan 2 FTP Traffic Shot 
50 s 50 s 50 s 
6.6 Classification of Effects 
Source: WIS 
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NB 2 Hub D-Pc FTP Traffic Shot 
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Classification by Criticality 
Level Criticality Severity Description 
U unknown 
Unable to determine due to effects on another 
component or not observed. 
N no effect undisturbed 
No effect occurs or the system can fulfill his mission 
without disturbances. 
I interference limited 
The appearing disturbance does not influence the 
main mission. 
II degradation severe 
The appearing disturbance reduces the efficiency 
and capability of the system. 
III 




The appearing disturbance prevents that the system 
is able to fulfill its main function or mission. 
IV Loss of system catastropically 
The occurring effects and error states result in loss 
or physical destruction of the system component 
under consideration. 
6.6 Classification of Effects 
Source: F. Sabath; Classification of Electromagnetic Effects at System Level”, Ultra-Wideband, Short Pulse Electromagnetics 9,  
 Springer Science + Business Media, pp. 325- 334, 2010, ISBN 978-0-387-77844-0 
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Evaluation 
Criticality 































6.6 Classification of Effects 
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6.7 Survey of Effects 




XL Extreme Low < 0,1 kV/m 
L Low 0,1 – 1 kV/m 
M Intermediate 1 – 10 kV/m 
H High 10 – 100 kV/m 
XH Extreme High > 100 kV/m 
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Summary: Microcontroller  
Threat Effect Level 
band U N I II III IV 
CW Hypo L M 
HPM Hypo L / M H 
WB Meso N / D N / D N / D N / D 
UWB Hyper L / M M M / H H 
N / D: No Data Available 
6.7 Survey of Effects 
22.01.2021 
33 
Page 65 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Summary: PC 
Threat Effect Level 
band U N I II III IV 
CW Hypo XL / L L / M M N / D 
HPM Hypo XL L L / M M N / D 
WB Meso XL / L L M M N / D 
UWB Hyper XL / L L M M H 
N / D: No Data Available 
6.7 Survey of Effects 
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Summary: PC Network 
Threat Effect Level 
band U N I II III IV 
CW Hypo L L L / M M 
HPM Hypo L L L / M M / H 
WB Meso N / D N / D N / D N / D 
UWB Hyper L M M M / H N / D 
N / D: No Data Available 
6.7 Survey of Effects 
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Summary: Car 
Threat Effect Level 
band U N I II III IV 
CW Hypo XL L L N / D N / D 
HPM Hypo L / M M H H 
WB Meso L / M M H H 
UWB Hyper M H H XH N / D 
N / D: No Data Available 
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Effect Level 4 “Upset”  
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6.7 Survey of Effects 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 167 
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Computer Effect vs. Network Effect 
6.7 Survey of Effects 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 168 
22.01.2021 
36 
Page 71 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Trend: Susceptibility Threshold (II - degradation) 
System 
Threat Level 
CW HPM WB UWB 
Civil Electronic  
(general environment) 
XL L L L / M 
Civil Electronic  
(industrial environment) 
XL L / M L / M M / H 
Cars 
 
L M M H 
Avionics 
 
L M N / D N / D 
Military Electronics  
(general) 
L H M / H H 
Military Electronics  
(special requirements) 
L H H XH 
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Objective 
(1) Classification of identified risks in 
Risks that can be tolerated 
Risks that require further analysis 
Risks that need to be addressed/mitigated 
(2) Prioritizing necessary risk management 
measures 
7.1 Introduction 
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Risk Classification 
Risk are classified by comparing  
risk characteristics, evaluation criteria and 
scales (as specified during the establishment of 
the context)  
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Risk Assessment Criteria 
Usual criteria for the risk assessment are: 
 Frequency of Occurrence 
 Severity of Consequence 
 Chance of Detection 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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Frequency of Occurrence 
• Assumption of EMI attack/EMI exposure. 
The likelihood of EMI attack/EMI exposure  
  is not considered. 
This is dependent on non-technical aspects  
  and shall be determined separately if required. 
How often / likely does the consequence 
(effect, failure) occur when the system is 
exposed to an EMI environment (EMI attack). 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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Frequency of Occurrence 
P 
Probability/ 
Frequency of Occurrence 
Criterion 
0 - 1 improbable/ unlikely < 1% 
So unlikely, that it can be 
assumed that the event 
does not occurs. 
2 - 3 remote 1% - 5% 
Low possibility that an event 
occurs. 
4 - 6 occasional 5% - 50% 
Event will occur in some, but 
less than half of the cases. 
7 - 8  probable  50% - 90% 
Event will occur in more than 
half of the cases. 
9 - 10 frequent > 90% 
Most likely that an event will 
occur in approximately every 
case. 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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Severity of Consequence 
a) Quantitative evaluation 
• Acquisition Costs 
• Recovery cost 
b) Qualitative evaluation 
• Personal damages, environmental damage 
• Malfunction/restriction of processes/operation 
• Function/System Performance 
• Recovery effort 
How big is the potential damage or loss? 
 
What is the significance of the potential 
damage to the user of the system? 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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Severity of Consequence 
S Severity Description 
0 - 1 
undisturbed 
/negligible 
No effect occurs or the system can fulfill its mission without 
disturbances. 
2 - 3 
limited / 
marginal 
The appearing effects cause functional restrictions or working 
difficulties. They do not influence the main mission. 
4 - 6 severe 
The appearing disturbance reduces the efficiency and 
capability of the system. 
7 - 8  Very severe 
The appearing disturbance prevents that the system is able 
to fulfill its main function or mission. 
9 - 10 catastrophically 
Effects could result in one or more of the following: (1) death 
of human being, (2) permanent total damage or loss of the 
system, (3) irreversible significant environmental impact. 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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Chance of Detection 
Is it possible to prevent damage by repelling 
consequential errors? 
• Initiation of protective measures 
• Change of operating mode 
• Warning the user/operator 
Can the cause of error (EMI exposure) be 
detected in a timely manner (before 
secondary sequences occur) 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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0 - 1 certain 
EMI exposure is certainly detected. Primary 
error is detected before subsequent errors 
occurs. 
2 - 3 very likely 
Discovery of EMI exposure/primary error is 
very likely. 
4 - 6 likely 
EMI exposure/primary error is likely to be 
detected. 
7 - 8  unlikely  
Detection of EMI exposure/primary error is 
unlikely. 
9 - 10 Not detectable 
EMI Exposure/primary error cannot be 
detected for technical and/or economic 
reasons 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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Additional criteria 
• Performance parameters of critical functions 
• Specified functionalities 
• Functions to be ensured under EMI exposure 
• Functional safety 
7.2 Risk Evaluation Criteria 
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Risk Matrix - Overview 
• Classification of the potential extent of damage 
• Classification of the probability of occurrence 
• Representation of the potential extent of damage 
(vertical) and the associated probability of occurrence 
(horizontal) in matrix form. 
• Classification of fields into risk classes: 
• Red:  high risk/determined risk is not acceptable 
• Yellow:  significant risk/risk cannot be taken easily,  
 further analysis is required 
• Green:  low risk/risk is acceptable 
7.3 Risk Evaluation 
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Risk Matrix 













catastrophically II III III III III 
Very severe II II III III III 
severe I II II III III 
limited I I II II III 
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22.01.2021 
10 
Page 19 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 


























10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
P - Frequency of Occurrence 
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Risk Index - Overview 
• A risk index is a semi-quantitative measure of risk which is 
an estimate derived using a scoring approach using 
ordinal scales. 
• Risk indices can be used to rate a series of risks using 
similar criteria so that they can be compared. 
• Risk indices are essentially a qualitative approach to 
ranking and comparing risks. While numbers are used, 
this is simply to allow for manipulation. 
7.3 Risk Evaluation 
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Risk Priority Index (RPI)  
 
RPI = aS  S  aP  P  aD  D 
 
• By calculating the risk priority number (RPI), an attempt is 
made to establish a ranking of the risks. 
• 1 ≤ RPI ≤ 1000 
• There is the claim that the RPI, at least in comparison with 
other RPI of the same risk analysis, allows a statement in 
the sense of better/worse. 
S – Severity of Consequence   [0, 10] 
P – Frequency of Occurrence  [0, 10] 
D – Chance of Detection   [0, 10] 
7.3 Risk Evaluation 
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Risk Priority Index (RPI) 
7.3 Risk Evaluation 
RPI 
1 200 400 600 800 1000 
high Risk low medium Very high 
risk management  
measures 
possible  
but not  
required 
necessary urgently necessarily 
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Risk Priority Index (Example 1) 
7.3 Risk Evaluation 
• Frequency of Occurrence:  low P = 2 
• Severity of Consequence:  high S = 8 
limited functionality 
• Chance of Detection:  low D = 8 
• Risk Priority Index low RPI = 128 
  no measures required 
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Risk Priority Index (Example 2) 
7.3 Risk Evaluation 
• Frequency of Occurrence:  high P = 8 
• Severity of Consequence:  low S = 2 
Functional restrictions of operating elements 
• Chance of Detection:  low D = 8 
• Risk Priority Index low RPI = 128 
  no measures required 
22.01.2021 
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Risk Graph - Overview 
• Risk assessment based on the three criteria 
• Severity of Consequence 
• Frequency of Occurrence 
• Chance of Detection 
• Classification of all criteria in high and low class 
• Representation in the form of a decision tree 
• Assignment to five Performance Levels that represent 
• the strength of the risk and/or  
• the contribution to risk mitigation.  
7.3 Risk Evaluation 
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Risk Graph (ISO 13849) 
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S Severity 
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limited / 
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4 - 6 severe 
S2 - high 7 - 8  Very severe 
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Risk Graph (ISO 13849) 
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0 - 1 
improbable/ 
unlikely 
F1 – low 2 - 3 remote 
4 - 6 occasional 
7 - 8  probable  
F2 - high 
9 - 10 frequent 
Page 28 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Risk Graph (ISO 13849) 
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Risk Graph (ISO 13849) 
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Risk management: ISO 31000 Process 
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Risk Mitigation / Risk Treatment 
Risk Mitigation or Risk Treatment includes all 
measures to  
•avoid,  
• reduce (strength),  
•change (type) and  
• transfer  
risks. 
7.1 Introduction 
Page 6 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Risk Mitigation Process 
7.1 Introduction 
Assessment of the 
remaining risk 
Realization of a risk 
mitigation measure 
Analysis of the  
remaining risk 
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Starting Points 
•Omission of risk-enhancing processes 
•Replacing components/subsystems 
•Remove/prevent EMI sources 
•Manipulation of the probability of occurrence 
•Diversification 
•Mitigation / limitation of effects 
7.1 Introduction 
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Objectives of Protection 
7.2 Protective Measures 
(1) Avoid destructions 
(2) Prevent & limit upsets 
(3) Reduce disturbances  
and interferences 
to  
a) maintain system performance, 
b) ensure functionality, and  
c) protect components 
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Types of Protective Measures 
7.2 Protective Measures 
Organizational Measures 
• Spatial distribution 




• Conducted protection 
• surge arrester 
• filter  
• isolating transformer 
• Design 
• Classification and separation of 
conductors 
• Monitoring  
• of system performance 
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Starting Points in the EMI interaction model 
EM Felds 














of the distance 
Reduction of  
the coupling 
Protection  
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Essential Objectives 
• Reduction of energetic effects 
• Reduction of the input energy 
• Limitation of voltage 
• on signal lines 
• on power lines 
• Monitoring  
• of the system state (latch up) 
• of the EM environment 
• Checking the consistency of data 
7.2 Protective Measures 
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Protective Measures 
• Shielding of 
• Buildings 
• Cases / chassis  
• Cable 
• Grounding 
• Galvanic Isolation 
• isolating transformer (power lines) 
• optoelectronic coupler / fiber optic lines (FOL) (signal lines) 
• Surge arrestor (power lines) 
• Filter / band limiter (signal lines) 
 
7.2 Protective Measures 
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Shielding - Objective 
The overall principle is to enclose all of the potentially 
vulnerable electronics within a closed metal shield  
• to decouple the electromagnetic field via reflection and 
absorption, and  
• to decouple conducted disturbances at the shield by  
• making very good quality electrical bonds of the cable 
shield to the outside of the enclosure shield (shielded 
cables and conducting penetrations) 
• shunt the coupled current to Earth via the enclosure 
shield by good bonding and a nonlinear protective 
device (unshielded conducting penetrations) 
 
7.2.1 Shielding 
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Shielding topology protection concept 
7.2.1 Shielding 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 149 
22.01.2021 
9 
Page 17 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Shielding phenomena of a barrier to a plane wave 
7.2.1 Shielding 
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dominated by  
absorption (t, s) 
dominated by  
reflection (s) 
Shielding Attenuation 









absorption loss (aA) 
total loss (aS) 
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Typical Values of Shielding Attenuation 
7.2.1 Shielding 
0 - 10 dB 
Very low shielding attenuation  
No protection against disturbances 
10 – 30 dB 
low shielding 
slight disturbances can be eliminated 
30 – 60 dB 
Average shielding in HF region 
High shield attenuation against magnetic fields in 
the LF range 
60 – 90 dB 
Appropriate shielding for medium to large  
EMC problems 
90 – 150 dB 
the maximum which is possible with extremely 
good shielding 
150 dB Proof border of the today's technology 
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Shielding integrity; grounding conductors 
7.2.1 Shielding 
proper compromising         serious validation 
 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 149 
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Shielding integrity; groundable conductors 
7.2.1 Shielding 
proper compromising serious validation 
 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 149 
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Shielding integrity; insulated conductors 
7.2.1 Shielding 
proper compromising serious validation 
 
Source: D. Giri, R. Hoad and F. Sabath; High-Power Electromagnetic Effects on Electronic Systems, Artech House, 2020, ISBN 978-1-63081-588-2, p 149 
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Protective Measures 
• Shielding of 
• Buildings 
• Cases / chassis  
• Cable 
• Grounding 
• Galvanic Isolation 
• isolating transformer (power lines) 
• optoelectronic coupler / fiber optic lines (FOL) (signal lines) 
• Surge arrestor (power lines) 
• Filter / band limiter (signal lines) 
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Grounding - Objective 
Ensure that conducting objects and circuits of a (distributed) 
system operate relatively to the same voltage level by: 
• defining a zero-voltage reference (ground structure) and 
• bonding conducting (metallic) objects and circuits to that 
reference structure through a low-impedance,  
non-current-carrying connection. 
7.2.2 Grounding 
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Grounding - important points  
Ground structures  
 serve as local zero-volt references 
 must be a good conductor at the frequencies of interest 
 does not have to be electrically small 
 does not have to enclose the electronics (A ground  
 structure is not a shielding enclosure) 
 cannot carry intentional currents (at least not at the  
 amplitudes and frequencies of interest) 
 must be able to carry unintentional currents with a  
 sufficiently low impedance (to control unintentional  
 voltages 
7.2.2 Grounding 
Source: American National Standard Dictionary for Technologies of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP),  
  and Electrostatic Discharge (ESD), ANSI C63.14-1992 
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Protective Measures 
• Shielding of 
• Buildings 
• Cases / chassis  
• Cable 
• Grounding 
• Galvanic Isolation 
• isolating transformer (power lines) 
• optoelectronic coupler / fiber optic lines (FOL) 
(signal lines) 
• Surge arrestor (power lines) 
• Filter / band limiter (signal lines) 
 7.2 Protective Measures 
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Galvanic isolation - Objective 
Galvanic isolation is a principle of isolating functional 
sections of electrical systems to prevent current flow; no 
direct conduction path is permitted. 
• Energy or information can still be exchanged between the sections by 
other means, such as capacitance, induction or electromagnetic 
waves, or by optical, acoustic or mechanical means.  
• Galvanic isolation is used where two or more electric circuits must 
communicate, but their grounds may be at different potentials.  
• It is an effective method of breaking ground loops by preventing 
unwanted current from flowing between two units sharing a ground 
conductor. 
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Isolation transformer 
• are designed with attention to capacitive coupling between 
the two windings 
• A grounded Faraday shield between the primary and the 
secondary greatly reduces the coupling of common-mode 
noise 
• block transmission of the DC component in signals from 
one circuit to the other 
• allow AC components in signals to pass 
• are often used to protect secondary circuits and 
individuals from electrical shocks between energized 
conductors and earth ground  
7.2.3 Galvanic Isolation 
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Isolation Transformers 
• Large isolation voltages (5 kV),  
• good common-mode rejection,  
• no attenuation of differential-mode 
overvoltage 
• Block common mode currents 
7.2.3 Galvanic Isolation 
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Optoelectronic Coupler 
• is an electronic component that 
transfers electrical signals between two 
isolated circuits by using light 
• Large isolation voltages (5 kV),  
• Good common-mode rejection, 
• Easy to use to receive data, difficult to 
use to transmit data,  
• Fast devices (<1-ps switching time) are 
expensive 
7.2.3 Galvanic Isolation 
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Protective Measures 
• Shielding of 
• Buildings 
• Cases / chassis  
• Cable 
• Grounding 
• Galvanic Isolation 
• isolating transformer (power lines) 
• optoelectronic coupler / fiber optic lines (FOL) (signal lines) 
• Surge arrestor (power lines) 
• Filter / band limiter (signal lines) 
 
7.2 Protective Measures 
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Surge Arrestor - Objective 
A surge arrester is a device to protect electrical equipment 
from over-voltage transients. 
• Also called a surge protection device (SPD) or  
transient voltage surge suppressor (TVSS) 
• To protect a unit of equipment from transients occurring on an attached 
conductor, a surge arrester is connected to the conductor just before it 
enters the equipment.  
• The surge arrester is also connected to ground and functions by 
routing energy from an over-voltage transient to ground if one occurs, 
while isolating the conductor from ground at normal operating voltages. 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Overview Surge Arrestor 
•Voltage Dependent Resistor (VARISTOR) 
•Diode (Suppressor Diode, Zener Diode) 
•Thyristor (Silicone-controlled rectifier (SCR)) 
•Spark gap 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Voltage Dependent Resistor (VARISTOR) 
• VARISTORS are voltage-
dependent resistors. They 
change their resistance value as 
a function of the applied voltage.  
• The resistance value of a 
VARISTOR decreases as the 
voltage increases.  
• When the voltage drops, the 
resistance value of the 
VARISTOR rises. 
• From a certain voltage, the 
VARISTOR becomes low-
impedance and thereby 
prevents a further voltage rise. 
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Voltage Dependent Resistor (VARISTOR) 
• have a symmetric current/voltage 
characteristic, i.e. the polarity of the 
VARISTOR is irrelevant. 
• fast response  time (tres < 0,5 ns);  
• capable of large energy absorption;  
• can safely conduct large currents  
(1 kA for 20 ps)  
• Characterized by a large parasitic 
capacitance (1 to 10 nF) 
• are inexpensive 
• VARISTOR are used both for protecting 
sensitive electronic circuits and in heavy 
current technology. 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
22.01.2021 
20 
Page 39 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Zener Diode / Suppressor Diode 
• A reverse-biased Zener diode exhibits a 
controlled breakdown and allows the 
current to keep the voltage across the 
Zener diode close to the Zener 
breakdown voltage (UZ0). 
• If the blocking voltage falls below UZ0, 
the blocking layer is immediately 
restored.  
• The range between IZmin and IZmax is 
called the working range or 
breakthrough range. 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
blocking zone 
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Zener Diode / Suppressor Diode 
• have an asymmetric current/voltage 
characteristic, i.e. the polarity of the 
Diode is relevant. 
• fast response  time (tres < 0,1 ns);  
• selection of precisely determined 
clamping voltages  
(between about 6.8V and 200V) 
• small maximum allowable current 
(<100A for 100 pF)  
• large parasitic capacitance (1 to 3 nF). 
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Thyristor 
The characteristic voltage-current 
curve of a thyristor is subdivided  
into 
• the reverse breakdown  
• the reverse blocking region 
• the forward blocking region 
• the forward transition region 
• the forward conducting region 
 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Thyristor 
• In the reverse blocking region a thyristor 
behaves in a similar way to a diode; all 
current, apart from a small leakage current is 
blocked. 
• If the reverse breakdown region is reached, 
the insulation breaks down due to the 
depletion layers at the junctions. In most 
cases, reverse current flowing in the 
breakdown region would destroy the 
thyristor. 
• When the thyristor is forward biased no 
current apart from a small leakage current 
flows. This is called the forward blocking 
mode, which extends to a comparatively 
high voltage called the Forward Break over 
Voltage. 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Thyristor 
• If a current is applied to the gate of the 
thyristor whilst it is operating in the forward 
blocking region, it is triggered and its forward 
resistance falls to a very low value. 
• due to the low forward resistance of the 
thyristor in this mode, allows very large 
(several amperes) currents to flow in the 
´forward conducting region´ 
• if forward current falls below the ´holding 
current´ value or the anode to cathode 
voltage is reduced to very near 0V, the 
thyristor will return to its forward blocking 
region 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Thyristor 
• have an asymmetric current/voltage 
characteristic, i.e. the polarity of the 
thyristor is relevant. 
• slow to turn on or turn off response  
(tres < 0,2 ms);  
• Small voltage (0,7 V to 2 V) across 
conducting thyristor 
• can tolerate sustained large currents 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Spark Gap 
• consists of two conducting electrodes separated by a gap 
usually filled with a gas such as air,  
• designed to allow an electric spark to pass between the 
conductors.  
• When the potential difference between the conductors 
exceeds the breakdown voltage of the gas within the gap, 
a spark forms, ionizing the gas and drastically reducing its 
electrical resistance.  
• An electric current then flows until the path of ionized gas 
is broken or the current reduces below a minimum value 
called the "holding current".  
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Spark Gap; Examples 
7.2.4 Surge Arrestor 
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Dynamic Characteristic of a Spark Gap 
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Spark Gap 
• have a symmetric current/voltage 
characteristic, i.e. the polarity of the 
thyristor is irrelevant. 
• requires large voltage (~100V) to 
conduct;  
• can be slow to conduct  
(large response  time)  
• low voltage in arc mode 
• Can safely conduct large currents  
(5 kA for 50 pF) 
• possible “follow current”  
(sustained short circuit) 
• very small parasitic capacitance (<2 pF) 
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Comparison characteristic curves   
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Protective Measures 
• Shielding of 
• Buildings 
• Cases / chassis  
• Cable 
• Grounding 
• Galvanic Isolation 
• isolating transformer (power lines) 
• optoelectronic coupler / fiber optic lines (FOL) (signal lines) 
• Surge arrestor (power lines) 
• Filter / band limiter (signal lines) 
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7.2.5 Filter and Band Limiter  
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Filter 
• A band-pass filter (BPF) is a device that 
passes frequencies within a certain range and 
rejects (attenuates) frequencies outside that 
range.  
• A low-pass filter (LPF) is a filter that passes 
signals with a frequency lower than a selected 
cutoff frequency and attenuates signals with 
frequencies higher than the cutoff frequency. 
• A high-pass filter (HPF) is an electronic filter 
that passes signals with a frequency higher 
than a certain cutoff frequency and attenuates 
signals with frequencies lower than the cutoff 
frequency.  
7.2.5 Filter and Band Limiter 
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Band-Pass Filter 
7.2.5 Filter and Band Limiter 
Page 54 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
Band-Pass Filter 
7.2.5 Filter and Band Limiter 
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Ferrite Choke / Ferrite Bead 
• Ferrite Chokes work by blocking 
signals traveling via common mode 
and pass through differential-mode 
or “balanced” currents unchanged.  
• In the common mode all signals 
running along all the wires travel in 
the same direction.  
• When the unwanted signal is only in 
the common mode then the desired 
signal can pass through the filter via 
the differential-mode.  
7.2.5 Filter and Band Limiter 
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Ferrite Choke / Ferrite Beads 
7.2.5 Filter and Band Limiter 
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7.3 Protection Concepts and Methods  
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Multistage Protection Concept  
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Multistage Protection Concept  
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Multistage Protection Concept  
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Protection by LPF   
7.3 Protection Concepts and Methods 
Unprotected 
500 MHz LPF 
250 MHz LPF 
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Protection by LPF & GDT 
7.3 Protection Concepts and Methods 
Unprotected 
GDT without LPF 
GDT with 500 MHz LPF 
GDT with 250 MHz LPF 
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Protection by LPF & VARISTOR 
7.3 Protection Concepts and Methods 
Unprotected 
VARISTOR without LPF 
VARISTOR with 500 MHz LPF 
VARISTOR with 250 MHz LPF 
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Protection by LPF & Z-Diode 
7.3 Protection Concepts and Methods 
Unprotected 
Z-Diode without LPF 
Z-Diode with 500 MHz LPF 
Z-Diode with 250 MHz LPF 
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Protection by LPF & Z-Diode (detailed view) 
7.3 Protection Concepts and Methods 
Z-Diode with 500 MHz LPF 
Z-Diode with 250 MHz LPF 
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It is in the nature of the EMI threat that the operators of critical infrastructures
are treated confidentially in the context of the EMI risk management of documents
produced and lessons learned and are therefore not available as examples. As an
example for discussing and clarifying the methods of EMI risk management as well
as individual work steps in modeling the threat scenario, a fictitious infrastructure
was therefore created. This includes all system elements relevant to EMI risk man-
agement without being too specific to a single technical infrastructure.
A.1 General Description
The guiding principle in the creation of the fictional infrastructure was the control
centre of a technical supply infrastructure, such as:
• Network of an energy utility,
• water supply network,
• Traffic management or
• of a national logistics network.
The fictional infrastructure is located in an industrial area or a technology park
(see Fig. A.1). The area where the fictional infrastructure is located is south of the
Maxwell Parkway, a federal road, and north of the Heinrich Hertz Street, a main
road. The Ohm Drive forms the eastern border of the area, the Kirchhoff Drive forms
the western border. The roads running north-south between the Maxwell Parkway
and the Heinrich Hertz Street street are regularly driven by trucks. On the other hand,
the roads running in the east-west direction between the Ohm Drive and the Oerstedt
Drive are quiet and can only be used by vehicles up to the size of a transporter. As
can be seen from the location plan illustrated in Figure A.1, the system elements of
the fictional infrastructure are distributed over six buildings.
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Fig. A.1 Lageplan fiktiven Infrastruktur
Building 1 - Network Station 1:
• Location: Building 1 is located on the southern edge of the shown area, at the
mouth of Oersted Drive into Heinrich Hertz Street.
• Construction: The net station 1 is a one-story building built with mortar from
brick. On the north side there is an access door made of steel and a ventilation
opening shielded with a honeycomb grid. The net station 1 is connection to the
power supply network via a ground cable.
• Accessibility: Access to the building is through a closed steel door. Only the
operating staff has a key to open the door. (Az = 4i, limited access)
• Function: In the building is the network station 1 (SDF 1) including an uninter-
ruptible power supply (UPS 1) and the associated control technology (SCADA).
Building 2A:
• Location: The building 2A is located in the southwestern quadrant of the area
under consideration on Ampére Street. Two outbuildings (buildings 2B and build-
ings 2C) are installed in the south. The building 2B is connected to the building
2A and belongs to the considered infrastructure facility. There is no access be-
tween building 2A and building 2C . The building 2C does not belong to the
considered infrastructure. To the south of the building, on Heinrich Hertz Street
are two parking areas P2 and P3. The parking area P2 is managed and can only
be accessed with an access card.
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• Construction: Building 2A is a four-story reinforced concrete building. The in-
terior is constructed in dry walling.
• Accessibility: The ground floor and 1st floor are freely accessible for general
openness (Az =1i, freely accessible in a building). The 2nd and 3rd floors, on the
other hand, are secured by a doorman service. (Az =2i, supervised access in a
building)
• Function: There are offices throughout the building. On the ground floor and on
the 1st floor there are also laboratory rooms. Local servers are located in selected
rooms on the 2nd and 3rd floors.
Building 2B:
• Location: The building 2B is an extension to the building 2A. Immediately in
front of the building is the restricted parking space P2.
• Construction: Building 2B is a three-story reinforced concrete building. The
interior was constructed in dry walling.
• Accessibility: The entire building is freely accessible for general openness
(Az =1i, freely accessible in a building).
• Function: The building 2B is used as an office building.
Building 3:
• Location: Building 3 is located on the northern edge of the area under consid-
eration, between Maxwell Parkway and Volta Street. The building is part of a
building row consisting of five similar buildings (buildings 3 and 11 - 14) . Be-
tween the buildings there are lawns and footpaths.
• Construction: The building is designed in the form of a three-storey solid build-
ing made of limestone sandstone.
• Accessibility: Access to the building can only be made after identification by
means of an access card (Az =3i, controlled access in a building).
• Function: Building 4 contains the ICT network control center, the management
of building control technology for the entire infrastructure, office work places
and the data center II, consisting of a core switch and a database server farm.
Building 4:
• Location: Building 4 is located on the eastern edge of the shown area, north of
Building 5, in the middle of the Kirchhoff Drive. Southwest of the building lies
the parking lot P3, which is freely accessible and regularly used by trucks.
• Construction: Building 4 was built as a steel frame building with combined
glass/metal facade. The interior was constructed in dry walling.
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• Accessibility: Access to Building 4 is limited to the employees of ICT mainte-
nance team. After identification by means of an access card, these can enter the
building through an access lock (revolving door). All remaining employees and
non-service personnel receive access only after an identity check and a pocket
control. (Az = 4i, limited access)
• Function: In building 4, next to office workstations, is the data center I, with a
core switch, a database server farm, and the network node of the ICT network to
the Internet.
Building 5 - Network station 2:
• Location: Building 5 is located on the eastern edge of the shown area, south of
Building 4, in the middle of the Kirchhoff Drive. Southwest of the building lies
the parking lot P3, which is freely accessible and regularly used by trucks.
• Construction: The net station 2 is a one-story building built with mortar from
brick. On the north side there is an access door made of steel and a ventilation
opening shielded with a honeycomb grid. The net station 2 is connection to the
power supply network via a ground cable.
• Accessibility: Access to the building is through a closed steel door. Only the
operating staff has a key to open the door. (Az = 4i, limited access)
• Function: In the building is the network station 2 (SDF 2) including an uninter-
ruptible power supply (UPS 2) and the associated control technology (SCADA).
A.2 Accesibility
The accessibility (Az) of the respective buildings and their surroundings is shown in
Figure A.2. To each building with an accessibility of 2i (monitored) and above there
is a range of the general public in which monitoring is possible. By observing these
zones, which are characterized in Figure A.2 by a light blue shading, it is possible
to detect large interference systems or carrier platforms which are untypical for the
environment in a timely manner.
Access to the parking lot P2 requires identification of the driver by means of an
access card (controlled area). From the buildings 2A and 3, the terrain lying north of
the Ampere Streer between the Ohm Drive and the Oerstedt Weg is very restricted
or not visible due to hedges and shrubs. The parkinglots P4 and P5 on this site are
assigned to the general public, e.g. they are accessible to each person. Due to their
design they can only be used by vehicles up to the size of a small transporter. The
parking lot P3 is regularly used by trucks.
The evaluation for traffic areas and routes in the vicinity of the fictional in-
frastructure is shown in Figure A.3. In this representation, the minimum required
mobility (Me) is specified in the grey boxes. Mobile systems with less mobility
(MTP <Me) cannot be moved into the associated traffic areas and routes as an overall
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Fig. A.2 Location of the accessibility zones of a fictional infrastructure (Using the scale applied
in table ?? (page ??).)
system due to structural characteristics (e.g. barring, width of the path) or controls.
If the mobility (Mt) of the systems typical of the traffic areas and routes deviates
from the minimum required mobility (Me), this is noted in the blue boxes. For ex-
ample, the Kirchhoff Drive is usually used only by systems with a mobility M ≥ 3
(car, van, small truck). Due to its design, however, this road could also be used by a
truck or a semitrailer.
A.3 Energy Supply Network
The energy supply network of the fictional infrastructure was planned and imple-
mented in compliance with the high availability compendium [1] issued in Volume
M of the Federal Office for Security in Information Technology. Following the rec-
ommendation of a double feed-in of the energy supply1, the fictitious infrastructure
is supplied with electrical energy via the mains stations located in buildings 1 and
5. The Main Distribution Frame (MDF) of building 3 is fed exclusively via net-
work station 1. In contrast, the main distribution frames of buildings 2A/B and 4 are
fed both via the network station 1 and via the network station 2. In each building
of the fictional infrastructure, a Distribution Frame (DF) is connected behind the
MDF. The rooms are then supplied with electrical energy from the subdivisions of
1 measure VM.11.19
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Fig. A.3 Mobility of traffic areas and routes in the vicinity of a fictional infrastructure
the floor. The described power supply network is installed in the form of a TN-S
network2 with differential current monitoring by a Residial Current Monitor3.
Fig. A.4 Network plan of the electrical power supply of the fictitious infrastructure (solid line:
supply by network station 1; dashed line: supply by network station 2; blue: UPS buffered feed
2 measure VM.11.25
3 measure VM.11.26
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Fig. A.5 Local history of the power supply lines of the fictional infrastructure
In parallel with this power supply network, two uninterrupted power supply net-
works are deployed in the infrastructure. The uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
installed in the building 1 supplies the servers in the building 2A as well as those
in the building 3, the ICT network control center and the data center II. The UPS
in building 5 feeds the ICT network transition note and the data center I. Both UPS
are voltage and frequency independent power supplies (VFI-UPS) which on the one
hand support the downstream network at outreach of the power network for a suffi-
ciently long time and simultaneously trigger the targeted shutdown of the supplied
computers and servers. Both UPS can be maintained remotely from the ICT control
center. The power supply network supported by the UPS was installed in the form
of an IT network (without neutral conductor). The local course of the power supply
lines on the premises of the fictional infrastructure is shown in Figure A.4.
A.4 Information and Communication Network
The basic structure of the information and communication network (ICT network)
of the fictional infrastructure is formed by the data centers installed in the buildings
3 and 4, each consisting of a core switch and a downstream server farm. Both core
switches are connected via board-band optical fiber line4 to the ICT network tran-
sition note installed in the building 4 as well as to one another. The core switch in
building 3 is also connected to the ICT control centre. The data of the two server
farms are available as the main data center (building 3) and backup data center
4 green marked connections in figure A.6
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Fig. A.6 Network plan of the ICT network of the fictional infrastructure
(building 4) pursued. In regular operation, the data of the main data center are al-
ways mirrored to the backup data center, so that these data remain available in the
event of failure of the main data center.
In this sense, all building distributors are connected to both core switches. Within
the buildings, a subdivision is installed for each floor, via which the respective office
and laboratory workstations are connected to the ICT network. The ICT cabling
within the buildings was realised using RJ45 cable (Cat. 7 S/FTP) and between the
buildings as optical fiber cables.
The control technology (SCADA) installed in buildings 1 and 5 is connected in
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Generic Infrastructure - Objective 
Objective 
• System for explaining individual analysis steps 
• Model: Control center of a technical supply infrastructure 
Network control center of an power company 
Water supply network control unit 
Traffic management unit or 
A cross-regional logistics network hub 
22.01.2021 
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Generic Infrastructure - Characteristics 
Characteristics 
• System elements distributed across multiple buildings. 
• Stationary 
• Computer center 
• External bindings 
• 95% availability required 
• Focus on energy supply & IT system 
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Building 1 – Power Network Station 1 
Building 1 
• Location: The building 1 is located on the northern edge of the shown area, 
on the Entrance of the Oersted Drive to Heinrich Hertz Street. 
• Construction: The net station 1 is a one-story building built with mortar from 
brick. On the north side there is an access point made of steel and a 
ventilation opening shielded with a honeycomb grid.  
• Accessibility: Access to the building is through a closed steel door. Only the 
operating staff has a key to open the door. 
• Function: In the building is the network station 1 (SDF 1) including an 
uninterruptible power supply (UPS 1) and the associated control technology 
(SCADA). 
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Building 2A 
• Location: The building 2A is located in the southwestern quadrant of the 
shown area on Ampére Street. Two outbuildings (buildings 2B and buildings 
2C) are installed in the south. The building 2B is connected to the building 2A 
and belongs to the considered infrastructure facility. There is no access 
between the building 2A and the building 2C. The building 2C does not belong 
to the considered infrastructure. To the south of the building, on Heinrich Hertz 
Street are the parking areas P2 and P3. The parking area P2 is managed and 
can only be accessed with an access card. 
• Construction: Building 2A is a four-story reinforced concrete building. The 
interior was constructed in dry walling.  
• Accessibility: The ground floor and the 1 floor are freely accessible to the 
general public. The 2 and 3. floor is secured by a doorman service. 
• Function: There are offices throughout the building. On the ground floor and 
on the 1 floor there are also laboratory rooms. In selected rooms of the 2nd 
and 3rd floors local servers are operated. 
22.01.2021 
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Building 2B 
Building 2B 
• Location: The building 2B is an extension to the building 2A. Immediately in 
front of the building is the limited parking space P2. 
• Construction: Building 2B is a three-story reinforced concrete building. The 
interior was constructed in dry walling.  
• Accessibility: The entire building is freely accessible to the general public.. 
• Function: The building 2B is used as an office building. 
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Building 3 
Building 3 
• Location: Building 3 is located on the northern edge of the viewed area, 
between Maxwell Parkway and Volta Street. The building is part of a building 
row consisting of five similar buildings. Between the buildings there are lawns 
and footpaths. 
• Construction: The building is designed in the form of a three-story, limestone 
sandstone-brick massive building.  
• Accessibility: Access to the building can only be made after identification by 
means of an access card 
• Function: Building 4 contains the ICT network control center, the 
management of building control technology for the entire infrastructure, office 
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Building 4 
Building 4 
• Location: Building 4 is located on the eastern edge of the viewed area, north 
of Building 5, in the middle of Kirchhoff Drive. Southwest of the building lies 
the parking lot P3, which is freely accessible and regularly used by trucks. 
• Construction: Building 4 was built as a steel frame building with combined 
glass/metal facade. The interior was constructed in  dry walling.  
• Accessibility: Access to Building 4 is limited to the employees of ICT 
maintenance team. After identification by means of an access card, these can 
enter the building through an access lock (revolving door). All remaining 
employees and non-service personnel receive access only after identity and 
pocket control. 
• Function: Building 4 contains office work places, the data center I, with a core 
switch, a database server farm and the network transition node of the ICT 
network to the Internet. 
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Building 5 – Power Network Station 2 
Building 5 
• Location: The building 5 is located on the eastern edge of the shown area, 
south of building 4, in the middle of the Kirchhoff Drive. Southwest of the 
building lies the parking lot P3, which is freely accessible and regularly used 
by trucks. 
• Construction: The net station 1 is a one-story building built with mortar from 
brick. On the north side there is an access point made of steel and a 
ventilation opening shielded with a honeycomb grid.  
• Accessibility: Access to the building is through a closed steel door. Only the 
operating staff has a key to open the door. 
• Function: In the building is the network station 2 (SDF 2) including an 
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Power Supply 






























SDF: Site Distribution Frame MDF: Main Distribution Frame DF: Distribution Frame  








uninterruptible power supply (IT system blg. 1) 
uninterruptible power supply (IT system, blg. 5) 
power supply (TN-S system, blg. 1) 
Power supply (TN-S system, blg. 5) 
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Power Supply 
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IT-Network 















SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System  
Building 
Distributor 
Laboratory Work Place 
Office Work Place 
Office Work Place Office Work  
Place 








WAN FOL FOL (core switch blg. 4) 
FOL (core switch blg. 3) 
RJ-45 Cable (Cat, 7) 
control and communication system line Fiber Optic Line 
(FOL) 
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Accessibility 
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Accessibility 





outside inside Definition 
1o free X 
Area of the general public (outdoors) accessible to each 
person without special effort. 
1i free X 
Area of the general public (indoors) accessible to each person 
without special effort. 
2o monitored  X Area of the general public whose access is or can be monitored. 
2i monitored X Area in a building whose access is or can be monitored. 
3o controlled X Outdoor area that can only be entered after an identity check 
3i controlled X 
Area in a building that can only be entered after an identity 
check 
4o restricted X 
Outdoor control / restricted area that can only be accessed by 
authorized persons or after a pocket check. 
4i restricted X 
Control / restricted area in the building, which can only be 
entered by authorized persons or after a pocket check. 
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Mobility 
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Mobility 
Generic Infrastructure – Mobility, Scale 
Level 
(M) 
Mobility Volume Example 
1 stationary > 77m3 
Fixed 
installation 
2 transportable 10 - 77m3 
light truck –  
40‘ Container 
3 mobil 0,2 – 10 m3 car / van 
4 very mobil 0,02 – 0,2 m3 briefcase 
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PHL – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.2.1: 
Identified and list possible EMI hazards for the system parts 
of the fictional generic infrastructure installed in the building 
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PHL - Process 
1) Detection of potential sources of interference 
2) Detection of possible coupling paths 
3) Estimation of possible effects 
4) Documentation 
3.2.1 PHL 
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PHL – 1.) Detection of potential sources of interference 
 
Systematic detection of potential sources of interference 
and their locations 
Objective: Detection of as many sources of interference as 
possible (comprehensive detection) 
Approach: Capture of source classes 
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Accessibility 
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Mobility 
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PHL – 1.) Detection of potential sources of interference 
 
M = 2: 
  Heinrich Hertz 
Straße 
  Ohm Weg 
  Oersted Weg 
  Parking Lot P3 
3.2.1 PHL 
M = 3: 
  Ampere Straße 
Parking Lot P1 
Parking Lot P2 
Parking Lot P4 
 
M  4: 
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PHL – 2.) Detection of possible coupling paths 
Systematic registration: 
1) Affected subsystems 
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Building 2A 
Building 2A 
• Location: The building 2A is located in the southwestern quadrant of the 
shown area on Ampére Straße. Two outbuildings (buildings 2B and buildings 
2C) are installed in the south. The building 2B is connected to the building 2A 
and belongs to the considered infrastructure facility. There is no access 
between the building 2A and the building 2C. The building 2C does not belong 
to the considered infrastructure. To the south of the building, on Heinrich Hertz 
Straße are the parking areas P2 and P3. The parking area P2 is managed 
and can only be accessed with an access card. 
• Construction: Building 2A is a four-story reinforced concrete building. The 
interior was constructed in dry walling.  
• Accessibility: The ground floor and the 1 floor are freely accessible to the 
general public. The 2 and 3. floor is secured by a doorman service. 
• Function: There are offices throughout the building. On the ground floor and 
on the 1 floor there are also laboratory rooms. In selected rooms of the 2nd 
and 3rd floors local servers are operated. 
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Building 2B 
Building 2B 
• Location: The building 2B is an extension to the building 2A. Immediately in 
front of the building is the limited parking space P2. 
• Construction: Building 2B is a three-story reinforced concrete building. The 
interior was constructed in dry walling.  
• Accessibility: The entire building is freely accessible to the general public.. 
• Function: The building 2B is used as an office building. 
22.01.2021 
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PHL – 2.1) Registration of affected subsystems   
Description Function Building 2: 
Office work places (total building) 
Laboratory work places (ground floor & 1. floor) 
Server (2. & 3. floor) 
Main Distribution Frame (MDF) (ground floor) 
ICT building distribution (ground floor) 
3.2.1 PHL 
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Ground Plan 
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PHL – 2.2) Registration of Possible coupling paths 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 



















e) ICT building 
distribution 
2.2 Ohm Weg 2 – 70 m 
2.3 Oersted Weg 20 – 90 m 
2.4 Parking Lot P3 25 – 95 m 
3.2.1 PHL 
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PHL – 3.) Estimation of possible effects 
 
1) Malfunctions 
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PHL – 3.) Estimation of possible effects 
3.2.1 PHL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 



















e) ICT Building 
distribution 
i. Malfunctions 




2.2 Ohm Weg 2 – 70 m 
2.3 Oersted Weg 20 – 90 m 
2.4 Parking Lot P3 25 – 95 m 
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PHL – 4.) Documentation 
 
3.2.1 PHL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 



















e) ICT Building 
distribution 
i. Malfunctions 




2.2 Ohm Weg 2 – 70 m 
2.3 Oersted Weg 20 – 90 m 
2.4 Parking Lot P3 25 – 95 m 
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PHL – 4.) Documentation (2) 
 
3.2.1 PHL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 



















e) ICT Building 
distribution 
i. Malfunctions 




3.2 Ohm Weg 2 – 70 m 
3.3 Oersted Weg 20 – 90 m 
3.4 Parking Lot P3 25 – 95 m 
3.5 Ampere Straße 2 m 
3.6 Parking Lot P1 5 m 
3.7 Parking Lot P2 5 m 
3.8 Parking Lot P4 10 – 50 m 
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PHL – 4.) Documentation (3) 
 
3.2.1 PHL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 























4.2 Ohm Weg 2 – 70 m 
4.3 Oersted Weg 20 – 90 m 
4.4 Parking Lot P3 25 – 95 m 
4.5 Ampere Straße 2 m 
4.6 Parking Lot P1 5 m 
4.7 Parking Lot P2 5 m 
4.8 Parking Lot P4 10 – 50 m 
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PHL – 4.) Documentation (4) 
 
3.2.1 PHL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 









4.9 M = 4 
(very mobile) 










4.10 Building 2B 1 – 10 m 
4.11 Building 2C* 1 – 10 m 
4.12 Area around 
Building 2 
1 – 10 m 
4.13 Building 7* 10 - 50 m 
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EMI Risk Management - Exercise  
3.2.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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PHA – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.2.2: 
Identify, list and evaluate possible EMI hazards for the 
system parts of the fictional generic infrastructure installed 
in the building 2A by employing the PHA. 
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PHA - Process 
1) Detection of potential sources of interference 
2) Detection of possible coupling paths 
3) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
4) Estimation of possible effects 
5) Evaluation of effects 
6) Identification of risk management measures 
7) Documentation 
3.2.2 PHA 
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PHA - Process 
1) Detection of potential sources of interference 
2) Detection of possible coupling paths 
3) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
4) Estimation of possible effects 
5) Evaluation of effects 
6) Identification of risk management measures 
7) Documentation 
3.2.2 PHA 
   PHL 
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PHA – Starting Point PHL Documentation (M = 4) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 























4.2 Ohm Weg 2 – 70 m 
4.3 Oersted Weg 20 – 90 m 
4.4 Parking Lot P3 25 – 95 m 
4.5 Ampere Straße 2 m 
4.6 Parking Lot P1 5 m 
4.7 Parking Lot P2 5 m 
4.8 Parking Lot P4 10 – 50 m 
3.2.2 PHA 
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PHA – Starting Point PHL Documentation (M = 4) 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 









4.9 M = 4 
(very mobile) 










4.10 Building 2B 1 – 10 m 
4.11 Building 2C* 1 – 10 m 
4.12 Area around 
Building 2 
1 – 10 m 
4.13 Building 7* 10 - 50 m 
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PHA – 1.) Detection of potential sources of interference 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
Asumption: HPEM Source Typ M4-2:MB-b-2 
𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ 𝑟 = 227 kV 
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PHA – 1.) Detection of potential sources of interference 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 … 7 
Ref. 
Nr. 




Mobility Type PEMI Emax  r 
Possible 
Location 
4.9.1 M = 4 
(very mobile) 
 
M4-2:MB-b-2 227 kV Building 2A 
(ground &  
1. floor) 
4.9.2 Building 2A 
(2. & 3. floor) 
22.01.2021 
5 
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PHA – 2.) Detection of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 
Ref. 
Nr. 
Possible EMI Source Possible Coupling Path 
Affected 
Subsystem 













227 kV Building 2A 
(ground &  
1. floor) 






4.9.1.e ICT building 
distribution 
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PHA – 2.) Detection of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 
Ref. 
Nr. 
Possible EMI Source Possible Coupling Path 
Affected 
Subsystem 













227 kV Building 2A 
(2. & 3. floor) 
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PHA – 3.) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 
Ref. 
Nr. 
Possible EMI Source Possible Coupling Path 
Affected 
Subsystem 













227 kV Building 2A 
(ground &  
1. floor) 
radiated  5 m Office work 
places  
4.9.1.b  10 m Laboratory 
work places 
4.9.1.c 6 m /  
9 m 
Server 
4.9.1.d  5 m MDF 
4.9.1.e  5 m ICT building 
distribution 
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PHA – 3.) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 
Ref. 
Nr. 
Possible EMI Source Possible Coupling Path 
Affected 
Subsystem 













227 kV Building 2A 
(2. & 3. floor) 
radiated  5 m Office work 
places  
4.9.2.b 3 - 9 m Laboratory 
work places 
4.9.2.c  5 m Server 
4.9.2.d 6 m /  
9 m 
MDF 
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PHA – 3.) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 




Geometric damping due to distance and spherical field propagation: 
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PHA – 3.) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
Damping of EM fields by concrete as  
floor ceiling element 
f = 340 MHz  5 dB 
Damping due to propagation  
through floor and ceiling  
Source: Frenzel, T., J. Rohde und J. Opfer: Elektromagnetische Schirmung von Gebäuden, Band BSITR-03209. BSI, 2007 
22.01.2021 
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Page 15 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
PHA – 3.) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
Damping of EM fields by plasterboard as  
dry building wall with thermal insulation 
f = 340 MHz  0 dB 
Damping due to propagation  
through walls 
Source: Frenzel, T., J. Rohde und J. Opfer: Elektromagnetische Schirmung von Gebäuden, Band BSITR-03209. BSI, 2007 
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PHA – 3.) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 
Ref. 
Nr. 
Possible EMI Source Possible Coupling Path 
Affected 
Subsystem 













227 kV Building 2A 
(ground &  
1. floor) 
radiated  5 m  14 dB Office work 
places  
4.9.1.b  10 m  20 dB Laboratory 
work places 
4.9.1.c 6 m /  
9 m 
25 dB /  
34 dB 
Server 
4.9.1.d  5 m  14 dB MDF 
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PHA – 3.) Weighting of possible coupling paths 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 
Ref. 
Nr. 
Possible EMI Source Possible Coupling Path 
Affected 
Subsystem 













227 kV Building 2A 
(2. & 3. floor) 
radiated  5 m  14 dB Office work 
places  




4.9.2.c  5 m  14 dB Server 
4.9.2.d 6 m /  
9 m 
25 dB /  
34 dB 
MDF 
4.9.2.e 6 m /  
9 m 
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PHA – 4.) Estimation of possible effects 
 
1) Malfunctions 
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PHA – 4.) Estimation of possible effects 
 
3.2.2 PHA 




























4.9.1.c Server Malfunctions 
4.9.1.d MDF Malfunctions 
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PHA – 4.) Estimation of possible effects 
 
3.2.2 PHA 
















4.9.2.a.i Office work 
places  
Malfunctions 





4.9.2.c.i Server Malfunctions 
4.9.2.c.ii Destruction of 
components 
4.9.2.d MDF Malfunctions 
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PHA – 5.) Evaluation of effects 
 
1) Malfunctions 
2) Destruction of components/modules 
3.2.2 PHA 
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Risk evaluation – Severity of Potential consequences 
S Severity criterion 
1 Negligible 
No or minor effects occur; the system can fulfill 
his mission without disturbances. 
2 – 3 Limited/ Marginal 
The appearing effects cause functional 
restrictions or working difficulties. They do not 
influence the main mission. 
4 – 6 Severe 
The appearing effects reduce the efficiency and 
capability of the system. 
7 – 8 Very severe 
The appearing effects prevent that the system is 
able to fulfill its main function or mission. 
9 - 10 Catastrophic 
Effects could result in one or more of the 
following: death of human being, permanent 
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PHA – 5.) Evaluation of effects 
 
3.2.2 PHA 




















2 – 3 
Marginal 





4.9.1.b.ii Destruction of 
components 
4.9.1.c Server Malfunctions reduced 
efficiency 
4 – 6 
(Severe) 




4.9.1.e.i ICT building 
distribution 
Malfunctions Disturbed ICT 
network 
4 – 6 
(Severe) 
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PHA – 5.) Evaluation of effects 
 
3.2.2 PHA 




















2 – 3 
Marginal 





4.9.2.c.i Server Malfunctions reduced 
efficiency 
4 – 6 
(Severe) 










4.9.2.e ICT building 
distribution 
Malfunctions Disturbed ICT 
network 
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 1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Ref. Nr.







Level of Risk 





4.9.1.a.i M = 4 
(very mobile) 
M4-2:MB-b-2  227 kV Building 2A 
(ground &  
1. floor) 
radiated  5 m  14 dB Office work 
places 
Malfunctions Breakdown work 
place 
2 – 3 
Marginal 
  
4.9.1.a.ii          Destruction of 
components 
    
4.9.1.b.i        10 m  20 dB Laboratory 
work places 
Malfunctions     
4.9.1.b.ii          Destruction of 
components 
    
4.9.1.c       6 m /  
9 m 
25 dB /  
34 dB 
Server Malfunctions reduced efficiency 4 – 6 
(Severe) 
  





4.9.1.e.i        5 m  14 dB ICT building 
distribution 
Malfunctions Disturbed ICT 
network 
4 – 6 
(Severe) 
  










 1 2 2a 2b 2c 3 4 5 5a 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Ref. Nr.







Level of Risk 





4.9.1.a.i M = 4 
(very mobile) 
M4-2:MB-b-2  227 kV Building 2A 
(2. & 3. floor) 
radiated  5 m  14 dB Office work 
places 
Malfunctions Breakdown  
work place 
2 – 3 
Marginal 
  
4.9.1.a.ii          Destruction of 
components 
    
4.9.1.b       3 - 9 m 15 – 34 dB Laboratory 
work places 
Malfunctions     
4.9.1.c.i        5 m  14 dB Server Malfunctions reduced  
efficiency 
4 – 6 
(Severe) 
  







4.9.1.d       6 m /  
9 m 
25 dB /  
34 dB 





4.9.1.e       6 m /  
9 m 




Malfunctions Disturbed  
ICT network 
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EMI Risk Management - Exercise  
3.3.2 Structured What-if Technique 
(SWIFT) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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SWIFT – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.3.2: 
With the help of SWIFT, the possible EMI hazards for the 
system parts installed in building 1 of the fictional 
infrastructure should to be identified and recorded. 
 
• The task should be handled in groups of 3-4 students. 
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SWIFT - Process 
1) Preparation 
2) System description and specifications 
3) Capture of previously known risks 
4) Selection of a process step 
5) Discussion of deviations 
6) Risk identification 
7) Evaluation of remediation measures 
8) Documentation 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – 1.) Preparation 
Prior to the workshop in which the analysis is conducted, 
the moderator creates a list with 
• ‘Prompt’ words, 
• Phrases and 
• Questions 
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SWIFT – Process step  
• Example: Energy supply 
• start-up / turning on 
• normal operation 
• full use of the capacity 
• malfunction (e.g. emergency shutdown, insulation 
violation, ground closure) and 
• shut down / Switch off 
• … 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – ‘Prompt’ Words 
• Field exposition 
• Interference signal 
• Malfunction 
• Failure / shutdown 
• Under voltage / over voltage 
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SWIFT – Phrases 
• What if,...? 
• What would happen if...? 
• How could...? 
• Could anyone...? 
• Could something...? 
• Anyone ever...? 
• Did anything ever...? 
• … 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – Questions (examples) 
• What if, building 1 would be irradiated by an EMI source 
(M = X/type) on location P? 
• Could someone place an EMI source (M = X/type) in 
building 1? 
• What would happen if subsystem S had a malfunction? 
• What would happen if subsystem S failed/is shutdown? 
• Could someone generate a wrong control signal on the 
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SWIFT – 2.) System description and specifications 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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PHL – 2.) System description and specifications 
 
3.2.1 PHL 
• Location: The building 1 is located on the northern edge of the 
shown area, on the Entrance of the Oersted Weg to Heinrich 
Hertz Straße. 
• Construction: The net station 1 is a one-story building built 
with mortar from brick. On the north side there is an access 
point made of steel and a ventilation opening shielded with a 
honeycomb grid.  
• Accessibility: Access to the building is through a closed steel 
door. Only the operating staff has a key to open the door. 
• Function: In the building is the network station 1 (SDF 1) 
including an uninterruptible power supply (UPS 1) and the 
associated control technology (SCADA). 
22.01.2021 
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SWIFT – 3.) Capture of previously known risks 
• Known risks 
 none 
• previous experiences and EMI events 
 none are known 
• known control and protection element 
 redundant feeding of buildings 2A/B and 4 
 uninterruptible power supply (UPS) 
 overvoltage protection at the power supply feed-in 
• Restrictions 
 none 
 3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – 4.) Selection of a process step 
• Considered process step 
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SWIFT – 5.) Discussion of deviations 
Q:  What if, building 1 would be irradiated by an EMI  
 source (M = 3) on parking lot P1? 
A:  Field coupling into the building. 1 (D = 0 dB) 
Q:  Could this field coupling lead to interference in  
 subsystems? 
A:  Yes, interference signal in SCDADA 
 As a result, the UPS network 1 shuts down 
 As a result, the data center II, ICT control center and 
 server in building 2A shut down also. 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
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SWIFT – 5.) Discussion of deviations 
Q:  What if, building 1 would be irradiated by an EMI  
 source (M = 2) on parking lot P3? 
A:  Field coupling into the building. 1 (D = 0 dB) 
Q:  Could this field coupling lead to interference in  
 subsystems? 
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SDF: Site Distribution Frame MDF: Main Distribution Frame DF: Distribution Frame  








uninterruptible power supply (IT system blg. 1) 
uninterruptible power supply (IT system, blg. 5) 
power supply (TN-S system, blg. 1) 
Power supply (TN-S system, blg. 5) 
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SWIFT – 6.) Risk identification 
At the end of each expert discussion (workshop) 
• identified risks (including their consequences) are 
summarized; and 
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SWIFT – 6.) Risk identification 
Consequences: 
Server in the building. 2A temporarily not usable 
Data Center II Failure 
 loss of redundancy 
reduced performance 
 Failure ICT control unit 
Options to control: 
 restarting the UPS network 
 Filtering the signal lines 
3.3.2 SWIFT 
Page 18 Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath, 16.10.2020 
Institut für Grundlagen der Elektrotechnik und Messtechnik 
Fachgebiet Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit 
SWIFT – 7.) Evaluation of remediation measures 
The expert's team: 
• Checks whether the discussed controls are suitable and 
effective 
• Prepares a statement on the effectiveness of risk controls 
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EMI Risk Management - Exercise  
Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) 
Dr.-Ing. Frank Sabath 
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BTA – Exercise / Home Work 
Tasks 3.3.7: 
With the help of BTA, the possible EMI hazards for the 
system parts installed in building 1 of the fictional 
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BTA - Process 
1) Definition of Top Event - Hazard 
2) Identification causes 
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BTA - 1) Definition of Top Event - Hazard 
The Top Event 
 results from the hazard. 
 must be controlled in order to prevent damage 
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Ground Plan 












Heinrich Hertz Street 
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Source (M = 2) 
on P3 
Source (M = 4) in 
front of bldg. 1 
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Power Supply 






























SDF: Site Distribution Frame MDF: Main Distribution Frame DF: Distribution Frame  








uninterruptible power supply (IT system blg. 1) 
uninterruptible power supply (IT system, blg. 5) 
power supply (TN-S system, blg. 1) 
Power supply (TN-S system, blg. 5) 
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BTA – 3) Possible effects 
3.3.7 BTA 
Source (M = 2) 
on P3 
Source (M = 3) 
on P1 
Source (M = 4) in 

























 Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 4 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 2A/2B 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 3 
Shut down 
data center II 
EMI 
Exposition 
Source (M = 3) on 
Oersted Drive 
Shut down 
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BTA – 4.1) Barriers 
3.3.7 BTA 
Source (M = 2) 
on P3 
Source (M = 3) 
on P1 
Source (M = 4) in 
front of bldg. 1 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 2A/2B 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 4 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 3 
Shut down 
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BTA – 4.2) Measures 
3.3.7 BTA 
Source (M = 2) 
on P3 
Source (M = 3) 
on P1 
Source (M = 4) in 
front of bldg. 1 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 2A/2B 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 4 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 3 
Shut down 
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BTA – 5) Documentation 
3.3.7 BTA 
Source (M = 2) 
on P3 
Source (M = 3) 
on P1 
Source (M = 4) in 
front of bldg. 1 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 2A/2B 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 4 
Disturbance energy 
supply bldg. 3 
Shut down 
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Scales for categorizing characteristic parameters
Scale for Accessability (Az)
Az Acces- outside inside Definition
sibility
1o free x Area of the general public (outdoors) acces-
sible to each person without special effort.
1i free x Area of the general public (indoors) accessi-
ble to each person without special effort.
2o monitored x Area of the general public whose access is or
can be monitored.
2i monitored x Area in a building whose access is or can be
monitored.
3o controled x Outdoor area that can only be entered after an
identity check.
3i controled x Area in a building that can only be entered af-
ter an identity check.
4o restricted x Outdoor control / restricted area that can only
be accessed by authorized persons or after a
pocket check.
4i restricted x Control / restricted area in the building, which
can only be entered by authorized persons or
after a pocket check.
383
384 C Scales for categorizing characteristic parameters
Scale for Probability
PO Probability Level Description
0 improbable/ < 0,5% So unlikely, that it can be assumed that
1 unlikely 0,5%−1% the event does not occurs.
2 remote 1%−2% Low possibility that an event occurs.
3 2%−5%
4 occasional 5%−12% Event will occur in some, but less
5 12%−25% than half of the cases.
6 25%−50%
7 probable 50%−75% Event will occur in more than
8 75%−90% half of the cases.
9 frequent 90%−97% Most likely that an event will occur
10 > 97% in approximately every case.
Scale for Knowledge
KD Knowledge Level Description Example
1 Novice general knowledge
2 Skilled basic understanding amateur electronics




4 Graduate academic knowledge and
professional expertise
engineer
5 Expert expert knowledge and pro-
found expertise
Scale for Financial Recourses/ Costs
Cexp Financial Recourses Example Costs
1 low < 1.000 e low costs
2 moderate 1.000 - 10.000 e moderate costs
3 increased 10.000 - 100.000 e increased costs
4 high 0,1 - 1 Mio e high costs
5 extreme high > 1 Mio e extreme costs
C Scales for categorizing characteristic parameters 385
Scale for Availability of Technology
AVC Verfügbarkeit Definition
0 not available not offered on the market
1 of-the-shelf available in the commercial market-place (e.g. de-
partment stores); can be bought by anyone
2 commercially available available in specialty stores; can be bought by any-
one
3 specialized trade available only in specialized trading companies;
acquisition is limited to commercial customer
4 lomited acquisition limited acquisition under conditions or to regis-
tered buyer, special designed components
5 restricted acquisition trade or acquisition prohibited by law
Scale for Volume and Mobility
M Mobility Volume Example
1 stationär > 77 m3 fixed installation
2 transportabel 10−77 m3 light truck, conatiner
3 mobil 0,2−10 m3 car, van
4 sehr mobil 0,02−0,2 m3 briefcase, backpack
5 hoch mobil < 0,02 m3 beverage can, attache case
Frequency Bands (Table 2 in [2])
Radar Nomenklatur ITU Nomenklatur
Band (Radar) Frequency Range Frequency Range Band No. Band (ITU)
HF 3 MHz < f ≤ 30 MHz 3 MHz < f ≤ 30 MHz 7 HF
VHF 30 MHz < f ≤ 300 MHz 30 MHz < f ≤ 300 MHz 8 VHF
UHF 0,3 GHz < f ≤ 1 GHz
L 1 GHz < f ≤ 2 GHz 0,3 GHz < f ≤ 3 GHz 9 UHF
S 2 GHz < f ≤ 4 GHz
C 4 GHz < f ≤ 8 GHz
X 8 GHz < f ≤ 12 GHz 3 GHz < f ≤ 30 GHz 10 SHF
Ku 12 GHz < f ≤ 18 GHz
K 18 GHz < f ≤ 27 GHz
386 C Scales for categorizing characteristic parameters
Scale for Bandwidth [3]









HO 0,00 < BF ≤ 0,01 0,00 < br ≤ 1,01 sinusoidal signal, pulse-
modulated sinusoidal
Mesoband ME 0,01 < BF ≤ 1,00 1,01 < br ≤ 3,0 damped sinusoidal signal
Sub-
Hyperband
SH 1,00 < BF ≤ 1,63 3,00 < br ≤ 10,0 Chirp
Hyperband HE 1,63 < BF ≤ 2,00 10,00 < br ≤ ∞ gaussian pulse, bipolar pulse,
double exponential pulse
Scale for Frequency Agility
FAG Frequency Agility Definition Remarks
1 fixed frequency ∆ f = 0 The source works on a fixed (cen-
ter) frequency and is not tunable.
2 low |∆ f/ fc| ≤ 1% The (center) frequency can be
tuned up to 1%.
3 moderate 1% < |∆ f/ fc| ≤ 10% The (center) frequency can be
tuned up to 10%.
4 high 10% < |∆ f/ fc| ≤ 25% The (center) frequency can be
tuned up to 25%.
5 very high |∆ f/ fc| ≥ 25% The (center) frequency can be
tuned by more than 25%.
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